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Edito, by Alexandrina Najmowicz, European Civic Forum Director
e launched Activizenship magazine as 
an attempt to capture current trends 
and transformations affecting civil 
society’s activities across Europe, to 
connect ideas and experiences about 
the role of civic movements and organizations 
in revitalising democratic and political space.
Even if civil society has played a major 
role in many circumstances where the issues 
of Equality, of Solidarity, of Democracy were 
at stake, we witnessed over the last decade 
worrying trends which, left unanswered, 
might put a serious threat on the future of 
open societies, on the future of Europe as a 
community of values and an area of freedom, 
security and justice for all.
The global crisis has revealed the fragility 
and, in some cases, the systemic disfunctioning 
of our societies. Democratic representation is 
being confronted to a crisis of legitimacy and 
a claim for accountability. The current EU 
framework failed to deliver on the promise 
of solidarity, social justice and democracy. 
Mounting racist prejudices are extremely 
worrying in some countries, fed by the pressure 
of regressive movements promoting ethnic or 
religious exclusion.
Civil liberties are systematically sacri-
ficed in the age of mass surveillance for the 
sake of security. Governments’ initiatives from 
Hungary to France, Spain or the UK put severe 
threat on democracy and fundamental free-
doms of expression and assembly. 
Have we entered a vicious circle where 
regressive policies in terms of democracy and 
social cohesion reinforce regressive forces, 
which deny the European values and the 
universality of Human rights? Restrictions 
in the equality of access to social rights for 
migrants have started more than a decade ago 
in Western Europe, precisely in Denmark. 
Unfortunately, this trend goes hand in 
hand with the rise of authoritarian drifts in 
some of the Member States. Hungary is the 
most emblematic case, seemingly followed 
by Poland recently, in an attempt to build 
an “illiberal democracy”, undermining 
fundamental freedoms and the rule of law, 
mainly by limiting the independence of the 
judiciary, reducing media freedoms and 
intimidating criticism by civil society. 
Ironically, the EU has harshly sanctioned 
non-compliance with the economic rules 
by certain Member States, but is proving 
quite lenient when it comes to defending its 
founding fundamental rights and values. 
Paradoxically, the EU has tools to 
encourage the rule of law and respect for 
fundamental rights in countries in accession 
but not efficient instruments to safeguard 













Edito, by Alexandrina Najmowicz, European Civic Forum Director
What role for civil society in influencing 
the framing of public policies reflecting the 
European values enshrined in Treaties? Civic 
resilience and capacity to stand up against re-
gressive trends is crucial to oppose the system-
atic erosion of our democracy. Alongside free 
and independent media, civic organizations 
and movements represent an essential actor 
for democratic checks and balances.
First and foremost, by their everyday 
actions with people, on the ground, they give 
meaningful substance to fundamental values, 
rights and liberties. They promote education to 
citizenship and Human rights, contributing to 
the development of a democratic culture. We saw 
recently how they massively mobilised for the 
welcome of refugees fleeing war and violence. In 
Spain, Greece, Portugal, Poland, Hungary, just 
to cite some, they took to the streets to claim 
solidarity in the crisis, to condemn attacks to 
rights, rule of law and liberties. But they cannot 
substitute to public action and policies.
Likewise, civil society organisations 
organise to advocate for values, rights and 
liberties to be properly safeguarded by 
institutions. In September 2014 for example, 
1 000 NGOs from all across Europe stood in 
solidarity with Hungarian NGOs and signed 
an appeal to the European Commission, the 
European Parliament and the Council of 
Europe to take the lead in  implementing both 
diplomatic efforts and effective measures to 
prevent the undermining of democratic values 
in Hungary. European networks of NGOs 
successfully opposed the designation of the 
Commissioner in charge of “citizenship”, given 
his disastrous track record in this area during 
his term of office in the Hungarian government.
In both their action-oriented and advocacy-
oriented capacity, they contribute to keeping 
our societies inclusive and democratic. When 
their critical role is disregarded, denied or 
threatened, the whole democratic space is 
shrinking, both at EU and national levels. 
This Activizenship issue features a few pages 
of comicsForequality previews. This project 
has been awarded Media Initiative of the 
Year within the last European Democratic 
Citizenship Awards organised by the European 
Civic Forum.
We are particularly thankful to Camilo Collao 
[We are all dogs], Dace Sietina [In Lak’ech], 
Angela Njoroge [Burocrazy], Mari Ahokoivu 
[Is it wrong to use sterotypes of your own 
country to your advantage?] and Amanda Baeza 
[Children reveal what adults hide] for the 







P olitical developments in Hungary over the last five years showed systematic crack down on 
European democratic values, the rule of 
law, Human rights and civil liberties such 
as the freedom of association, freedom 
of expression and freedom of the press 
and wider media. Is this part of, as some 
observers say, Victor Orban’s strategy 
to install an “illiberal state”? These 
smear-campaigns aimed at discrediting 
NGOs as “foreign agents” similar to 
Vladimir Putin’s ones, echo the worries 
expressed in Hungarian civil society 
since 2010 already, and which remain 







how To dismanTle a democraTic sTaTe
By Erik Uszkiewicz
Following the elections in spring 2010, the newly formed Orbán government attained a two-thirds 
supermajority in the Hungarian legis-
lature. This majority – which also con-
ferred a constitution-making power on 
Fidesz – enabled the governing party 
to engage in a full-scale and systematic 
transformation of the entire Hungarian 
legal and institutional framework. At 
the time, one could only suspect what 
soon become everyday reality and prac-
tice: The Orbán government began dis-
mantling the institutions underlying 
the democratic rule of law and the sys-
tem of checks and balances, discredit-
ing and ignoring fundamental rights. 
The goal of this writing is to briefly 
present – by focussing its analysis on 
two particular issues – those anoma-
lies and distortions in legislation and 
the application of the law which have 
resulted in institutionally entrenched 
The Orbán government 
began dismantling the 
institutions underlying the 
democratic rule of law and 
the system of checks and 
balances
9
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judges was also expanded 
at the same time, there-
by cementing their posi-
tions on the court. 
Following regime 
transition, Hungary 
joined the ranks of those coun-
tries where the institution of independ-
ent ombudspersons was established, 
which functioned in an exemplary fash-
ion. Thus, for example, an independent 
data protection commissioner ensured 
that information rights would contin-
ue to prevail. This institution was abol-
ished by the government and replaced 
with a government agency/authority, 
whose executive was known to belong 
to pro-government circles. The previ-
ous data protection commissioner was 
let go even before his term expired. In 
light of the above, the European Court 
of Justice condemned the government 
in 2014, arguing that the independent 
protection of rights implies that the 
person in charge of this protection be 
allowed to finish his/her term of office. 
Though the ECJ made out a violation of 
EU law, it did not restore the previous 
data protection commissioner to his of-
fice, and it allowed the newly created in-
stitution to go on with its operations. 
One of the last nails in the cof-
fin of the constitutional state based 
on the rule of law is a breach of judi-
cial impartiality and independent law 
enforcement. The president of the 
highest judicial body in the ordinary 
and systemic violations of principles, 
rights and freedoms guaranteed by the 
European Union. 
independent institutions
One of the most characteristic 
features underlying the operations of 
constitutional democratic systems is 
that neither branch of government 
wields exclusive powers, and that 
the mutual responsibility of these 
branches to act as checks on each 
other guarantees that fundamental 
rights will prevail and prevents certain 
institutions from wielding excessive 
powers. In addition to the classic 
branches of government, there are 
further independent institutions 
which help ensure that all aspirations 
to control exclusive powers are held in 
check, and that the rights and freedoms 
of citizens continue to prevail. During 
the past five years under the Orbán 
government, these institutions have 
basically undergone two major changes:
 ɖ for one, legislation was used to 
“rein in” these institutions. In some 
cases, this resulted in the wholesale 
abolition of the entire organisation and 
their replacement by new institutions, 
while in other instances the statutory 
framework regulating the given 
institution was completely rewritten. 
 ɖ new leaders and members were 
appointed to lead these organisations, 
and the new executives and board 
members are all government 
loyalists, which thus allows for direct 
and immediate control over these 
institutions. 
Already early 
into the term of the 
Orbán government, 
the Constitutional 
Court had on sev-
eral occasions de-
clared certain new 
statutes unconstitu-
tional on the basis of 
the previous Hungarian Constitution, 
which was effective before 1 January 
2012. In response, Parliament amend-
ed the Constitution on 12 occasions, 
based on proposals submitted by 
the government or government par-
ty MPs, incorporating provisions that 
the Court had struck down as un-
constitutional into the Constitution, 
thereby ensuring that the august body 
would not have another opportuni-
ty to review the norm. Subsequently, 
in 2011, Parliament adopted the new 
Fundamental Law of Hungary. Due 
to many controversial provisions, the 
Fundamental Law failed to achieve a 
full social consensus in terms of being 
regarded as the foundation of the legal 
system. In the meanwhile, Fidesz has 
selected the candidates to replace re-
tiring Constitutional Court judges from 
among its own loyal clientele, ensuring 
that future legislation would be adopted 




immigrants or the 
suggestion to bring
 
back the death 
penalty, have 
stirred up public 
opinion not only 
in Hungary but 




judicial system, previously known as 
the Supreme Court, was also removed 
from office before his term expired, 
and, in reference to archaic traditions, 
the institution was renamed Curia. In 
May 2014, the incumbent president of 
the Supreme Court at the time, András 
Baka, prevailed in his legal action 
against Hungary before the European 
Court of Human Rights. The ECHR held 
that the government’s actions had vio-
lated rights enshrined in the European 
Convention on Human Rights. Another 
key problem was that the governing 
majority also changed the rules on the 
mandatory retirement age for judg-
es, which lead to a European Court of 
Justice decision sanctioning the gov-
ernment. Despite these decisions, the 
new institutional structure ultimately 
prevailed in this area as well, and a ma-
jority of judges who were forced into 
retirement did not return to the bench. 
One of the most prominent scan-
dals this year is the so-called “bro-
kergate”, the criminal proceedings 
concerning which are still pending. This 
particular case, along with some previ-
ous criminal proceedings, allow for the 
conclusion that the prosecution author-
ities are also incapable of discharging 
their responsibilities independently and 
impartially. Prosecutor General Péter 
Polt, who is in charge of the strongly 
hierarchical Prosecutor’s Office, is of-
ten seen together with the prime min-
ister and other leading politicians at 
public events. The close friendship be-
tween the prosecutor general and the 
prime minister is common knowledge 
in large parts of the public. 
elections and the 
faR‑Right bReakthRough 
As the first four years of the second 
Orbán government drew to a close in 
2014, once again elections were held in 
Hungary. In their analysis of this event, 
the OSCE’s ODIHR office wrote that 
the Hungarian elections were 
“free but not fair”. 
The playing field was 
tilted to favour the 
right: Several factors 
favoured Fidesz, in-
cluding redrawn dis-
trict boundaries, the 
rules concerning cam-
paign financing, the 
occupation by the gov-
ernment of a large por-
tion of media outlets, and 
the practically incompre-
hensible system of winner’s compensa-
tion in elections, which pads the results 
of the strongest party. Of all the condi-
tions that distort democratic electoral 
competition, the author would like to 
highlight one in particular. As part of the 
Fourth Amendment of the Fundamental 
Law, the governing party mandated that 
campaign advertising by political par-
ties may only be disseminated in public 
service media, under equal conditions 
for all parties competing in the election. 
In response to domestic and interna-
tional protests, the relevant provisions 
were changed by the Fifth Amendment 
of the Fundamental Law, which al-
lowed for political advertisements to 
be disseminated by commercial media 
– with equal conditions for all compet-
itors and only for free. Given that com-
mercial media obtain a major portion of 
their revenues from selling their adver-
tising time/space, there were obviously 
no commercial media that offered the 
parties that competed in the elections 
the opportunity to adver-
tise with them. This is a 
good illustration of the 
Orbán government’s po-
litical practice: It wishes 
to enact extremely re-
strictive measures, but 
once it faces intense 
protests it “relaxes” 
its original plans and 
chooses a “softer” so-
lution. Yet as the ex-
ample above shows, 
even though the reg-
ulatory solution chosen may be differ-
ent, its actual impact is the same. The 
rules are still restrictive and suppress 
liberty. A fully accurate picture of the 
Hungarian elections also needs to point 
out, however, that the opposition par-
ties – despite all difficulties or maybe 
exactly as a result thereof – proved in-
capable of offering a real alternative to 
A growing number 
of people accuratel
y 
realise the deep 
social, economic 
and moral crisis 
the country is in 
6 JUly 1998
Viktor Orban becomes 
Prime Minister of a 
coalition government
27 May 2002
Viktor Orban steps down 
as Prime minister
29 May 2010
Orban becomes Prime 
Minister for the second 
time after winning the 
elections with a large 
margin
DEcEMBEr 2010
The first law on media 
control is passed, 
triggering controversy in 
the EU
2011
Hungary drops from 
“free” to “partly free” on 
press freedom according 
to Freedom House 
ranking
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the masses of voters who were disillu-
sioned with politics. The opposition 
parties, dragged down by lacking vital-
ity and internal tensions, were caught 
up in a situation where they were com-
pelled to enter into an alliance with one 
another before the election. On the 
whole, the combination of these fac-
tors led to another two-thirds victory 
for Fidesz. Yet the Orbán government 
did not get to hold on to this majori-
ty for long. In two by-elections held in 
rural towns, in February and April, re-
spectively, Fidesz lost its supermajori-
ty in Parliament. At the same time, the 
surge of the Hungarian far-right is dis-
concerting. There is no space to go into 
detail about the reasons underlying the 
expansion of the right-wing radical par-
ty, Jobbik, but it needs to be emphasised 
that the success of this extremely rac-
ist, euro-sceptic and radical party is a 
frightening development. In all prob-
ability, Fidesz has also felt the heat 
from the surge in Jobbik’s popularity, 
and the governing party seeks to fore-
stall Jobbik’s further expansion through 
a policy of “outrighting the far-right”, 
for the time being primarily in the form 
of government communication. The 
prime minister’s comments against 
immigrants, the banal and extremely 
discriminatory national consultation 
launched on the subject of immigration, 
or the suggestion to bring back the 
death penalty, have stirred up pub-
lic opinion not only in Hungary but at 
the European level as well. President of 
the European Commission Jean-Claude 
Juncker and numerous other European 
politicians have expressed their con-
cerns and called for these issues to be 
resolved as quickly as possible. 
“eveRyday expeRience”
Situations and cases that involve a ne-
glect of European values are often called 
everyday human rights violations. It 
would be near impossible to take stock 
of and classify all these violations in the 
areas of public education, the national-
isation of private pensions, the assault 
on autonomy in higher education, the 
criminalisation of homelessness and 
the growing vulnerability of other mar-
ginalised groups. In the meanwhile, the 
feeling of euphoria is increasingly wan-
ing. This sentiment was still vibrant af-
ter the 2010 elections, which followed 
on the heels of eight years of left-lib-
eral malgovernance, but has now faded 
along with the hope that the conserva-
tive right-wing government will reme-
dy the country’s woes. Perceptions of 
corruption are also on the rise. Once 
the ill-placed sentiment that “I, too, 
could be among the beneficiaries” dis-
sipated, it has lead to growing percep-
tions of corruption. There are no more 
lands, tobacco shops, exclusively state-
owned assets and concessions to be 
THE AuTHor 
erik uszkiewicz 
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25 april 2011
Adoption of the new 
Hungarian Constitution, 
a clear shift towards 
authoritarianism 
that endangers 
media pluralism, the 
independance of justice, 
the freedom of religion 
and the possibility of 




changes, the fourth ones 
in fourteen months. 
Several provisions are 
clearly curtailing civil 
liberties. The Law on 
Freedom of Information 
was amended in a way 
which allows state 
institutions that manage 
data broad leeway in 
rejecting requests for 
public information, 
restricting full access 
to data to specific 
governmental institutions.
14 aUgUst 2013
Orban claims that some 
NGOs are “serving 
foreign interests”. These 




Fidesz wins the general 
elections, and secure its 
two third majority at the 
Parliament.
26 JUly 2014
Orban declares his 
objective to build an 
“illiberal State”. He refers 
to NGOs as “paid political 




reallocated; these sources have gone 
dry, and in an act which marks a seri-
ous interference with the autonomy of 
higher education, the last sanctuary re-
maining, the chancellery positions at 
universities, are now being awarded to 
persons close to the governing party. As 
perceptions of corruption 
are on the rise, satis-
faction with the gov-
ernment and political 
support for Fidesz are 
gradually declining. A 
growing number of 
people accurately real-
ise the deep social, eco-
nomic and moral crisis 
the country is in. 
It is worth empha-
sising briefly that the 
process of explaining to 
wide swathes of society 
why the mass of complex 
economic/social/legal/po-
litical changes that rapidly followed re-
gime transition were necessary, or to 
help render the importance of these 
changes intelligible to them, has failed 
comprehensively. The democratic in-
stitutions made many mistakes in the 
two decades prior to the Orbán govern-
ment’s entry into office, which is an im-
portant factor in itself. An even greater 
one is the lack of self-reflection and the 
ability to learn, as is the absence of ac-
countability. It would only be a slight 
exaggeration to say that 
Hungary is a country 
where misdeeds have no 
consequences. There is 
no social justice, pov-
erty is rampant, and no 
government has taken 
any effective measures 
to ensure the equali-
ty of minority groups. 
Little wonder, then, 
that in the affect-
ed milieus market 
economy, democ-
racy/the rule of law 
and the European 
Union have become 
enemies rather than things to aspire 
to. They have practically become curse 
words. The responsibilities of the par-
ties that refer to themselves as demo-
cratic parties for these developments is 
that they failed to properly debate these 
issues in public, did not offer proper 
alternatives and practically considered 
these problems as isolated phenomena. 
In the meanwhile Jobbik, with its own 
radical, extreme, exclusionary and dem-
agogic communication has proved ca-
pable of luring many – especially youths 
– into its own camp. 
ngo sectoR
In the decade after regime transition, 
the NGO sector in Hungary began 
to develop significantly, including 
volunteer groups organising village 
festivities, various associations that 
offer miscellaneous leisure activities, all 
the way to a panoply of organisations 
fighting for social welfare and justice, 
as well as professional NGOs. 
It took the scandal surrounding 
the consortium of NGOs entrusted 
with managing the Norway NGO Fund 
for the Hungarian civil sector – or rath-
er some emblematic organisations en-
gaged in standing up for human rights, 
the rule of law, minority rights, or an-
ti-corruption – to rethink their activi-
ties and turn towards a more activist 
approach also involving other types of 
activities. In the meanwhile, the gov-
ernment’s campaign to discredit NGOs 
that are not aligned with the ruling par-
ties is in full swing. This campaign has 
two objectives: to undermine the cred-
ibility of the affected NGOs and to de-
stroy their financial viability, which is 
already tenuous due to their lack of 
Those who take 









First criminal procedure 
is launched against the 
operator of the Norway 
Grants.
sEptEMBEr 8 2014
squads of police officers 
raided the offices of 
Ökotárs and Demnet, 
two foundations that 
were charged with the 
distribution of Norwegian 
grants for civil society.
1 OctOBEr 2014
Tibor Navracsics, former 
Hungarian Minister 
of Administration and 
Justice, is designated as 
European Commissioner 
for citizenship. Following 
strong reaction of 
European NGOs, 
Citizenship is removed 
from his portfolio.
21 OctOBEr 2014
A law proposal for the 
taxation of internet usage 
is made public by Minister 
of National Economy 
Mihály Varga.
26 OctOBEr 2014
After an online 
mobilisation campaign, 
the first mass protests 
against the law are 
organised in Budapest.
1 3
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reported by some NGOs – and that 
they will expect these organisations to 
confirm and support their opinions, and 
to correspondingly exclude potentially 
conflicting viewpoints from the work of 
the affected organisations. This could 
serve to increasingly push the way 
these organisations operate towards the 
extremes, and to further consolidate the 
vast polarisation of Hungarian social 
life, the mentality of staunchly opposed 
camps and the inability to communicate 
across the political divide. 
media
It was obvious to many that Viktor 
Orbán held the media responsible for 
the failure of his re-election bid after 
his first term in government ended in 
2002. His party almost immediately 
began to build a pro-Fidesz media em-
pire. One of the iconic figures of pro-
Fidesz circles (even though he almost 
never appeared in public), the entrepre-
neur Lajos Simicska, was a loyal ally in 
this process. It is thus hardly surprising 
that following the election of the new 
Orbán government in 2010, the major-
ity immediately began working on new 
media laws; two new laws were adopt-
ed and became effective with stunning 
speed. The 2010 media laws and the in-
stitutional framework they establish are 
resources. Those who take a critical 
stance towards the government are 
often labelled “traitors”, “Soros lack-
eys” or “foreign agents”, with the goal 
of suggesting that they only serve alien 
interests. 
The funding of Hungarian 
NGOs is in a tragic state. One of the 
striking aspects of institutionalised 
corruption under Orbán is that faux 
civil organisations – generally regarded 
as government friendly –, as well as 
other organisations that have somehow 
managed to cultivate friendly ties with 
the government, can count on budget 
subsidies. In the meanwhile, critical 
voices are engaged in a bitter struggle 
– often against one another – for every 
diminishing funding. An odd aspect 
of this situation is that international 
donor organisations engaged in the 
realm of promoting democracy, the 
rule of law or the protection of human 
rights classify Hungary as a developed 
democracy – also because of its EU 
membership – therefore automatically 
excluding it from the range of countries 
that may receive funding. It would 
be necessary to review such funding 
policies. What is needed is not for 
Hungary to enjoy a privileged position 
when such grant programmes are 
published or applications are reviewed; 
but Hungarian civil organisations and 
projects should have the opportunity to 
compete for such funds. It is probably 
not even necessary to go into detail 
about how NGOs seek to turn their 
basic activities into “projects” to attain 
funding for them. 
In the interest of securing 
alternative sources of funding, their 
dependence on individual donor 
organisations, or to simply diversify 
their income, a major proportion of 
Hungarian NGOs has launched a variety 
of programmes. Starting with the 1% of 
income taxes that citizens can allocate 
to support NGOs, and the organisation 
of miscellaneous crowdfunding events 
and campaigns, NGOs engage in a variety 
of methods to increase their funding. 
However, these imply a risk that citizens 
offering support will increasingly see 
themselves as “clients” – as has been 
31 OctOBEr 2014





refugees is launched by 
the Orban’s Government.
22 JUin 2015
 Orban announces his 
intention to build a fence 
along the border to 
prevent refugees from 
reaching Hungary.
1 JUly 2015
A public consultation 
is launched by the 
Government, introducing 





calls for the European 
Parliament to activate 
article 7 of the Lisbon 
Treaty to take sanctions 
against Hungary. LIBE 




WhO is ViKtOr OrBan
viktor Mihály Orbán , born 
31 May 1963, is the 
Prime Minister of 
Hungary and the 
president of the 
national conservative 
ruling party Fidesz. 
He was a vice 
chairman in the Liberal 
International from 1992 
to 2000, a Vice President in the European People’s Party 
from 2002 to 2012 and the Prime Minister of Hungary 
from 1998 to 2002. Since 2010, Orbán has been the 
Prime Minister of Hungary with a two-thirds majority 
of the seats in the Parliament of Hungary, which his 
party received in both the 2010 and the 2014 elections. 
After a 2015 by-election, the party lost its two-thirds 
supermajority needed for changing the Constitution, 
while still retaining a simple majority.
At the age of 14 and 15, he was a secretary of the 
communist youth organisation (KISZ) of his secondary 
grammar school. In 1988, Orbán was one of the founding 
members of Fidesz (an acronym for Fiatal Demokraták 
Szövetsége, the Alliance of Young Democrats).
In his first term in office as Hungarian Prime minister, he 
made himself known for highly controversial measures 
prefiguring more worrying changes to come: he replaced 
numbers of civil servants in various institutions and 
public offices, he reduced the frequency of sessions of 
the unicameral parliament, and replaced heads of many 
institutions by government-friendly individuals.
In 2001, the first European concerns over freedom of 
press were expressed by the International Federation 
of Journalists for “improper political influence in the 
media.” 
On the internal stage, Viktor Orban led the opposition 
from 2002 until 2010, while Fidesz achieved European 
success in 2004 European elections. In the 2009 
European Parliament elections, Fidesz won again by 
a large margin, garnering 56.36% of votes and 14 of 
Hungary’s 22 seats
During the 2010 parliamentary elections, Orbán’s party 
won 52.73% of the popular vote, with two-thirds majority 
of seats, which gave Orbán enough authority and power 
to change the Constitution.
After the 2014 parliamentary elections, Fidesz won 
a majority of 133 seats out of the 199 available in the 
National Assembly. Although, he won a large majority, he 
garnered only 44.54% of the national vote, down from 
52.73% in 2010. 
Since 2010, Viktor Orban took a flight of measures 
limiting civil rights, freedom of press, and threatening 
the work and independence of NGOs. (see details here: 
http://goo.gl/zHDCtK)
Most recently, Orbán ordered the erection of the 
Hungary-Serbia fence to block entry of illegal immigrants 
during the 2015 European migrant crisis so that Hungary 
would be able to register all the migrants arriving from 
Serbia, which is the country’s responsibility under the 
Dublin Regulation, a European Union law. 
symbols of an era and also key instru-
ments – though obviously not the only 
instruments – in the political consoli-
dation of this era. The new media au-
thority, for example, goes to significant 
lengths to serve Fidesz’s media policy 
objectives. Today we can state: As a re-
sult of the distorted public sphere, the 
media cannot perform its functions in 
terms of shaping public opinion, and it 
bears no minor measure of responsibil-
ity for the emergence of a society that 
is unable to communicate. 
An interesting aspect of this de-
velopment is that almost all legislative 
work with an impact on media freedom 
was followed by intense protests. One 
of the largest civil movements of this 
period, the initially independent Milla, 
which today is mostly moribund, was 
also created to protest the media laws 
15
1 . rise oF illiberal democracy 
and other government action aimed at 
curtailing free speech. 
The most important reasons un-
derlying the distorted structure of the 
public sphere:
 ɖ a state media rather than a public 
service media: in a uniquely Hungarian 
situation, public media are excessively 
financed, their organisation and 
decision-making mechanisms lack 
transparency, and their operations are 
propagandistic; they are practically 
turned into government mouthpieces
 ɖ the media has become the 
playground of oligarchs (in the radio 
market, for example, tender practices 
were used to turn a major portion of 
frequencies over to pro-government 
oligarchs, and numerous previously 
popular radio were compelled to cease 
operations);
 ɖ political and economic pressure 
(a particularly striking examples was 
the removal of the editor-in-chief of a 
major Hungarian newsportal, origo.hu 
– which is owned by a company that is 
a subsidiary of a German corporation 
– after he published an investigative 
piece on the prices of official foreign 
trips of an influential cabinet member; 
 ɖ the comprehensive structural 
politicisation of the media system
 ɖ concentrated state advertising 
spending and the manipulation of the 
advertising market
 ɖ the placement of government 
loyalists into all relevant positions 
involving media oversight, and the 
distribution of scopes of competencies 
and authorities in a way which ensures 
that they are all filled by reliable party 
soldiers. 
The government’s mo-
dus operandi is also illus-
trated by the series of events 
involving RTL Klub in 2014. 
Already during the election 
period in spring 2014, the 
largest commercial televi-
sion channel began to strike a 
critical tone towards the gov-
ernment. A growing slice of its 
work was devoted to investigative re-
porting and took on an edge that was 
unfavourable from the government’s 
perspective. In response, the govern-
ment introduced an unequivocally dis-
criminative media tax which mostly 
hurt RLK Klub (it was the only media 
outlet required to pay the highest tax 
rate and it also had to pay a major por-
tion of the entire tax revenue). Finally, 
in the war of pull and tug that broke 
out between RTL and the government, 
the latter finally had to relent, a ma-
jor factor in which was fear of the out-
come of proceedings that the European 
Commission was expected to launch. 
Viktor Orbán has repeatedly talked 
about a policy of “eastern opening”, 
about his “freedom struggle” against 
Brussels, the end of the West and deep-
ening economic, political and cultural 
ties with Russia. The idea of the internet 
tax, which is unprecedented in Europe, 
also meshes with this rhetoric. The goal 
was to introduce a completely unvia-
ble, gigabyte-based tax that would have 
deepened the digital divide and would 
have caused competitive disadvantage 
for the Hungarian economy, cutting off 
many from the possibility of using the 
internet. An unprecedented wave of pro-
tests was launched in response, tens of 




ing up mobile 
phone were shown throughout the 
world, and the protests were covered 
by all relevant international media out-
lets. Youths were energised to previous-
ly unseen degrees and they uniformly 
said no to distancing Hungary from the 
West, to disregarding EU values and to 
pro-Russian and pro-Putin policies. The 
protests soon took up other issues as 
well, with the organisers and speakers 
highlighting the desire for a just, di-
verse and inclusive society based on 
solidarity. 
the futuRe of illibeRal 
democRacy
Lest anyone have doubts that there is a 
deliberate political strategy at work to 
establish an illiberal democracy in 
Hungary, Viktor Orbán himself made 
this clear for everyone at his notorious 
speech in Tusnádfürdő. The speech car-
ried an unequivocal message: Orbán 
wants to leave everything behind that 
embodies the West in Hungary, and 
seeks to bring the country closer to 
states such as Turkey, Russia and 
Singapore. In Hungary today the divide 
is not between right-wingers and left-
wingers, not between Fidesz support-
ers and MSZP supporters, but rather 
between democrats and anti-demo-
crats. For the country as a whole, the 
question whether the democrats will be 
able to continue their activities and 
achieve results in this worrying situa-
tion is a key issue. The fate of a country 
rests on their shoulders. 
As a result of 
the distorted publi
c 
sphere, the media 
cannot perform 
its functions 







how ngos Take uP The challenge
interview with Veronika Mora, Director of Ökotárs Foundation
EuropEAn CiviC Forum: can you 
tell us more about the attacks 
of Orban’s government on civil 
society and how it has affected 
your work and the work of ngOs 
in general in hungary?
vEronikA morA: In April 2014, just two 
days after the general election which 
brought the repeated victory of the 
right-conservative government of 
Fidesz, the head of the Prime Minister’s 
Office, Mr János Lázár announced 
that he would initiate the re-negoti-
ation of how funding is provided by 
EEA countries – Norway, Iceland and 
Liechtenstein – to Hungarian NGOs, 
within the framework of development 
assistance provided by these countries 
to less developed EU member states. 
This signalled the start of a series of 
unprecedented governmental attacks 
and harassment of independent civ-
ic groups, especially those engaged in 
How NGOs face a series of 
unprecedented 
governmental attacks and 
harassment of independent 
civic groups, especially 
those engaged in human 
rights, anti-corruption, 
women’s and LBGT rights
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human rights, anti-corruption, wom-
en’s and LBGT rights. 
My foundation, Ökotárs as the 
head of the grantmaking consortium 
which managed the EEA/Norwegian 
NGO Programme in Hungary found 
itself in the centre of the conflict, 
which at first started as a media 
smear campaign orchestrated by the 
government. High ranking officials, e.g. 
deputy state secretaries accused us as 
being politically biased, oppositional 
“cheating nobodies”. However, this was 
soon followed by official inspections: 
in late May last year the PMO has 
announced publicly that the so-called 
Governmental Control Office will audit 
the use of the EEA/Norwegian funding 
– over which in our and our lawyers’ 
opinion they had no jurisdiction. It 
was also quite characteristic to the 
whole process that we always learnt 
everything from government-friendly 
media first - official notifications came 
only afterwards. Although our repeated 
requests to clarify the legal basis of the 
audit were never answered, we were 
forced to cooperate with the GCO, 
due to its wide ranging sanctioning 
powers. The ‘audit’ lasted throughout 
the summer – we also noticed that 
documents not previously in the public 
domain, but handed over to GCO by us 
during the course of the procedures 
somehow quickly found their way into 
government-friendly media – always in 
a damning context. 
By August, the administrative pro-
cesses turned into criminal accusa-
tions – made first in the media again. 
They ranged from fraud through mis-
management to unlicensed financial 
activity, and we soon learned that a 
criminal investigation has indeed been 
launched. This then escalated quickly: 
on the morning of the 8th of September, 
the National Bureau of Investigation in-
vaded our office with 20-odd police of-
ficers. They searched for documents 
related to the management and the 
grantees of the EEA/Norwegian NGO 
Programme, and also visited the office 
of our accountant, our IT provider and 
partners, and also the homes of some 
staff members (where we kept archived 
documents). The raid lasted the whole 
day, and in the meantime our colleagues 
were forbidden to communicate 
with the outside 
world by any means. 
The police confiscat-
ed written documents 
and laptops during 
the action. We filed a 
complaint against the 
search, and the court 
eventually ruled it to 
be unlawful in January 
2015, saying that there was no suspi-
cion upon which such a search could 
be funded. 
The GCO published its “report” in 
late October. This 40-pages document 
repeated all earlier accusations, 
however without any factual data 
supporting them – there were no names, 
amounts described or any other tangible 
information included. At the same time, 
government-friendly media leaked 
internal e-mail exchanges and other 
private matters of the foundations. 
Thus the media campaign continued 
– and while it decreased in intensity a 
lot it has not stopped up today, and its 
focus shifted away from the EEA grants 
to other NGO issues.
What is important that throughout 
this series of harassments we have been 
able to continue or operation as normal 
– e.g. two calls for proposals within the 
EEA/Norwegian NGO Programme have 
been closed, providing support to app. 
300 NGO’s projects. Many of these are 
being completed just now, while others 
will finish in the first months of 2016. 








circle of supporters, to really reach out 
to the broader public. For similar rea-
sons, there was little cooperation with-
in the sector (aside some issue-based 
networks such as that of environmen-
tal NGOs). As a result, broad segments 
of the general public had (and still have) 
no real grasp of what civil society is 
about, what are its roles and functions 
and why NGOs are important for de-
mocracy. Also, many NGOs do not re-
alize they are part of something bigger, 
a ‘sector’ that there are thing that bind 
them together.
thE ngO FUnD
the NGO Fund of the European Economic Area (EEA)/Norway Grants forms a small part of the 
overall EEA/Norway grants to Hungary. The EEA/Norway 
grants are grants from Norway, Liechtenstein and 
Iceland to 16 EU countries, mostly in the South and East 
of Europe. In Hungary, as in other recipient countries, 
the vast majority of funding goes to state projects. 
In Hungary, this amount is about €150 million for the 
current budgeting period 2009-2014. The NGO Fund in 
Hungary, which is independent of the Hungarian state, 
amounts to about €13.5 million for the period 2009-
2014. The overall objective of the EEA/Norway NGO 
programmes is to “strengthen civil society development 
and enhance contribution to social justice, democracy 
and sustainable development”.
The NGO fund is operated by four Hungarian civil 
society organisations, each responsible for the 
management and distribution of grants in a specific 
thematic area. These four organisations – often 
referred to as “the consortium” – are Ökotárs 
Foundation, Autonómia Foundation, DemNet and 
Kárpátok Foundation. Funds for organisations 
awarded grants are supervised directly by the Financial 
Mechanism Office (FMO) – a secretariat of donor 
countries based in Brussels - to recipient organisations 
following an open tender. Evaluators of the consortium 
select grant recipients according to a range of criteria 
set out in an agreement between the FMO and the 
consortium. Representatives of Hungarian government 
ministries participate in sessions to select grant 
recipients as observers, but do not have voting rights in 
these decisions.
Since 2013, the fund, its management and its 
beneficiaries have suffered repeated attacks and 
threats from Viktor Orban’s government, seriously 
jeopardising the whole scheme and the success of the 
funded projects. One of the most striking example 
of these attacks is the police raid on Ökotárs and 
Demnet, two foundations that were charged with the 
distribution of Norwegian money for civic purposes. 
which their income structures were 
dominated by state, and especially EU 
Structural Fund grants. While this al-
lowed NGOs to carry on with their ba-
sic activity and services, in turn it also 
discouraged innovation and the search 
for alternatives, leading to a “business-
as-usual” mode of operation, and – in 
retrospect – stagnation. We as grant-
makers have already observed this 
during the first EEA/Norwegian NGO 
Fund during 2008-9. In the relative 
abundance of funding, and more im-
portantly, the perception of future per-
spectives, most NGOs did not feel the 
need to build their constituencies and 
ECF: From what we understood 
hungarian civil society was 
caught unprepared by these 
attacks, can you explain why? is it 
the result of a lack of cooperation 
or coordination among ngOs in 
the country?
vEronikA morA: The attacks have high-
lighted some long-standing weakness-
es of the Hungarian NGO sector, which 
experts have warned about for years 
without much impact. In the decade 
between the early 2000’s and 2010-11 
Hungarian NGOs have enjoyed a rela-
tively stable working environment, in 
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THE AuTHor 
veronika móra has 
been working with the 
Hungarian Environmental 
Partnership Foundation 
(Ökotárs) since 1997 
and holds the position of 
the director since 2007. 
Besides her full time 
occupation she also has 
voluntary positions in a 
number of NGOs, among 
them the chairmanship 
of the Hungarian Donors 
Forum, which works on 
developing the (corporate) 
philanthropic culture in 
the country. 
Then, starting with 2011 sud-
den and profound changes shook 
the sector, and NGOs were una-
ble to handle these – there was a 
general feeling of apathy and “now 
what?” in the past few years. On 
the one hand, a new NGO law en-
tered into force at the beginning of 
2012, which while did not restrict 
the freedom to associate and oper-
ate, brought new administrative de-
mands, and many NGOs found it hard 
to interpret and adapt to the new regu-
lations. On the other hand, the funding 
environment has also changed drasti-
cally: state sources were cut back signif-
icantly, their distribution mechanisms 
were completely overwritten while the 
Structural Fund sources have effective-
ly dried up. This lead to a situation, that 
NGOs live day-by-day, unable to plan or 
to retain professional staff.
It was under these circumstanc-
es that the series of attacks have come 
which caught NGOs unawares, but has 
finally drew acute attention to the need 
for renewal, most importantly for pro-
actively communicating NGOs’ caus-
es and the work they do for the public 
good. For many people NGOs are still 
some alien creatures, with unclear man-
dates and motivations – this was clear-
ly shown by the weak public response: 
while there were demonstrations or-
ganized after the police raid, they did 
not manage to draw more that 1-2000 
people to the case. It clearly showed 
that NGOs have a long way to go to 
promote active citizenship and to mo-
bilize people to take issues in their own 
hands, starting really from the basics, 
from the grassroots level – and this in 
a society characterized by apathy and 
passivity.
The attacks also highlighted the 
need for coalition-building and self-
defence: NGOs realized they need to 
speak up on their behalf with a unified 
voice – because no one else will do it in 
their stead.
ECF: What lessons have you drawn 
since then? What are the ‘positive 
effects’ of these attacks in terms 
of structuration of civil society 
Organisations in hungary? What 
are your hopes and expectations 
for the near future?
vEronikA morA: The events of the past 
one-and-half year brought both positive 
and negative effects, but unfortunately 
also a widening gap within the sector. 
One the one hand large, well-estab-
lished, mainly capital-based advocacy 
NGOs – those attacked directly and the 
ones in solidarity with them – were able 
to ‘fight back’: as mentioned above, they 
broad segments 
of the general 
public had no real
 
grasp of what civi
l 
society is about, 
what are its roles 
and functions 





started building a self-defence coalition 
and were able to start adapting their 
communication and work on building 
their constituencies. This is of course a 
long-term process, but the first, crucial 
steps – simply the awareness and the 
will to tackle the problem – have been 
taken. Also, the increased media atten-
tion (especially online) resulting from 
the attacks provided a welcome side ef-
fect and ‘free advertisement’. 
On the other hand, smaller 
NGOs working on the countryside 
were indirectly hit harder. In these 
settlements, local interdependencies 
make it much more difficult for local 
NGOs to speak up or to voice criticism 
e.g. against the major. Municipal sources 
and contacts play an important role in 
the survival of these organizations, 
and the ‘Norwegian support’ could 
(and did) have a stigmatizing effect on 
these relations. Also, it will take longer 
for the new ideas and approaches to 
trickle down – significant gaps between 
different NGOs can be seen e.g. in the 
use of social media as a tool for both 
internal and external communication. 
The existing gaps are further exac-
erbated by the governmental commu-
nication which strongly differentiates 
among the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ NGOs – the 
former being those that limit them-
selves to purely charitable activities 
(often with a religious background), 
while those that move beyond this, ad-
vocate or voice concern automatically 
thE Dirty thirtEEn
on May 30th 2014, The Hungarian Prime Minister’s Office published a blacklist of 13 organisations 
labelled as the “dirty thirteen” regarded by the 
government as “leftist” after having received grants 
from the EEA/Norway fund.
ɖ Krétakör – foundation supporting independent art 
and theater projects and education
ɖ K-Monitor – organisation focused on bringing 
transparency to spending public funds
ɖ NANE – abbreviated from “women for women 
against violence,” is a foundation meant to promote 
action against domestic violence and to provide aid to 
victimized women
ɖ DIA – foundation spreading democratic values 
among young people
ɖ Transparency International – the Hungarian branch 
of the internationally renowned transparency and anti-
corruption advocate
ɖ Hungarian Women’s Lobby – Group advocating 
more active participation of women in politics
ɖ Hungarian Civil Liberties Union (TASZ) – possibly 
the best-known Hungarian civil liberties group that 
regularly criticizes legal infringements and also 
provides free legal representation to underprivileged 
victims
ɖ Asimov Foundation – affiliated with Atlatszo.hu, the 
foundation’s goal is to create and establish an online 
portal that provides access to all information that is of 
social importance
ɖ Roma Press Center – focused on instances of racial 
discrimination targeted at the Roma minority
ɖ Labrisz – association for the recognition and 
acceptance of lesbians
ɖ Patent – An “anti-patriarchal” organisation 
founded to raise awareness of gender-based 
discrimination and physical abuse towards women
ɖ LiFE – organisation for young people with liberal 
political views
ɖ Budapest Pride – organisation founded to 
represent and promote the interests of the Hungarian 
LMBTQ community 
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ECF: it seems that a future 
coalition of cross-sector civil 
society Organisations in hungary 
would be created soon. are you 
aware of it and if so, can you tell 
us more about it?
vEronikA morA: Yes, although as a grant 
making organization we are not taking 
active part in it. All the same we follow 
the developments - we see that this co-
alition is still at its first phases of devel-
opment, struggling to find its identity, 
role and voice. This understandably is 
a difficult process, especially as organi-
zations that had not have much contact 
earlier came now together – which is a 
value in itself, but they have a long way 
to go. It is practically impossible at this 
stage to predict how fast or in what di-
rection this cooperation will move, but 
I do hope it can contribute to the re-
newal of civil society in Hungary. 
fall in the latter category (with some ex-
ceptions in very specific policy fields). 
‘Foreign-funded” and “Soros-funded” 
remain almost curse words – most 
recently even informal groups like 
Migration Aid supporting refugees dur-
ing the height of crisis were tagged as 
such. NGOs must be aware of this and 
not to let themselves to be ‘divided and 
conquered’ in the hope to become bet-
ter positioned with the powers that be.
All in all, I’m cautiously optimistic 
– I believe that it is Hungarian NGOs 
themselves who must primarily deal 
with the new situ-
ation, working to-
gether closely and 
resisting intimida-
tion. While the atten-
tion and support of 
international organiza-
tions or the EU is im-
portant, mostly so that 
NGOs do not feel aban-
doned, this problem 
cannot be solved from 
abroad. NGOs must make 
up for the ‘lost decade’ I 
mentioned above – devel-
op constituency, cultivate 
domestic donors and step 
up their advocacy in a rel-
atively short time, which is 
of course not an easy task. 
I do hope that civil society 
will come out stronger in the 
end, albeit maybe changed: it is possi-
ble that some long-existing formalized 
NGOs will close down and informal, on-
line organizing will become more dom-







100 000 againsT The inTerneT Tax
By gulyas Balazs
The “100 thousand against the inter-net tax” was a campaign launched to prevent the government of 
Hungary to implement the proposed 
internet-tax. This campaign, innovative 
in many ways, has shown that despite 
Viktor Orban’s attacks, civil society is 
still ready to act and fight for civil liber-
ties and fundamental rights in Hungary.
The tax proposal has been another 
try by Viktor Orban’s almighty govern-
ment to limit the freedom of expression 
and the freedom of information by lim-
iting internet access, in particular for 
the poorest categories of the popula-
tion. Even though the governing party 
of Hungary won three elections in 2014, 
the campaign forced them to withdraw 
their senseless internet tax proposal. 
The campaign managed to achieve this 
via creating a primarily online commu-
nity and ensuring an extremely strong 
street presence, leading to the biggest 
This civic mobilisation has 
been awarded Campaign of 
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demonstration in the modern history 
of Hungary.
It took a mere ten days between 
the public announcement of the law 
proposal on the taxation of internet 
usage and its withdrawal. Ten days during 
which Balazs Gulyas and his colleagues 
mobilised hundreds of thousands of 
Hungarian. The mobilisation went first 
through social media before turning 
into the largest street protests ever seen 
in Hungary for the past 25 years not only 
in Budapest but also in smaller cities 
which hadn’t seen any protests since 
the 1956 revolution.
The Facebook page gathering the 
support for the cause rallied more 
people than any political party’s page 
in Hungary. This online mobilisation 
epitomises the rise of new forms of civic 
expression: more than ever, the internet 
allows individuals to organise civic and 
political action with limited resources 
compared to political party resources. It 
is even more striking as the movement 
against the Internet tax was triggered 
by individuals and remains a popular 
movement. Support from political 
parties was never sought nor desired. 
Hopes are shared that it augurs a wider 
awakening of Hungarian population and 
civil society around other issues such as 
the refugee crisis.
The communication style through 
social media, using internet memes* 
and digital culture references has been 
particularly important and relevant in 
sharing the message, in reaching out 
to a wide audience and mobilising the 
crowd. It has served the campaign even 
more as it created a gap with political 
parties’ communication largely unable 
to play with the communication codes 
of the younger generations in Hungary. 
The auThor 
balázs gulyás is the 
leader of the protest 
against the planned 
Hungarian Internet tax 
in October 2014. This 
civic mobilisation has 
been awarded Campaign 
of the year within ECF’s 
European Democratic 
Citizenship Awards 2015.
While the voices of Hungarian citi-
zens were heard in their country thanks 
to their online mobilisation and thanks 
to their shouts in the streets, they still 
remain unheard in Europe. The Internet 
tax is one among many initiatives taken 
by Orban’s government to try to silence 
the voices of individual citizens and civ-
il society organisations. Many of these 
breaches to civil liberties and funda-
mental rights have been widely criti-
cised but so far, to Balazs sadness, no 
answer were given by European 
Institutions to Hungarian people’s con-
cerns. 
* An Internet meme is a cultural phenomenon 





thE hUngarian hElsinKi cOMMittEE
since its founding in 1989, the HHC has acquired a strong reputation of professionalism and credibility. 
The HHC’s main areas of activities are centred on 
protecting the rights of asylum-seekers and other 
foreigners in need of international protection, as 
well as monitoring the human rights performance of 
law enforcement agencies and the judicial system. It 
particularly focuses on the conditions of detention, 
the effective enforcement of the right to defence 
and equality before the law. Beyond its long-standing 
experience in detention monitoring, advocacy as well as 
legal counselling and representation for detainees and 
asylum-seekers (e.g. over 12 000 asylum-seekers assisted 
since 1998), the HHC has unique expertise among 
European NGOs in human rights and asylum-related 
training. They delivered over 200 training sessions and 
courses in recent years in dozens of European and Latin-
American countries. As a member of the International 
Helsinki Federation for Human Rights and the European 
Council on Refugees and Exiles, the HCC shares and 
learns with other like-minded organisations.
The HHC has been particularly effective in representing 
the cause of detainees, refugees and other victims of 
human rights violation in recent years. Both the EU Court 
of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights 
decided favourably in several cases of asylum-seekers 
represented by the HHC. In 2013, the HCC reached a 
favourable judgment in 82% of the asylum appeal cases 
they represented before national courts. The HHC 
submitted formal complaints against Hungary to the 
European Commission 
for non-compliance 
with EU law, which 
resulted in a pilot 
infringement procedure 
against the country 
and the rectification of 
several shortcomings 
in legislation and practice. International human rights 
bodies (United Nations, Council of Europe), rapporteurs, 
national courts and the US State Department regularly 
quote the HHC as a reliable source of information about 
human rights, rule of law and asylum in Hungary.
The HHC is the only refugee-assisting civil society 
organisation regularly invited to train state authorities 
and judges in various countries. Since 2004, the HCC 
has been managing the world’s only online university 
curriculum for the teaching of refugee law, the Refugee 
Law Reader in 4 languages, gathering over 100 000 
visits per year. The HHC has gained specific reputation 
for leading some of the most 
innovative and powerful training 
initiatives in the field of asylum 
internationally, such as the 
CREDO initiative (increasingly 
used and referred to in different 
parts of the world). The HHC 
has applied innovative solutions 
in other areas of its activity as 
well: in an effort to reform the 
Hungarian criminal legal aid 
system, it has in cooperation with 
the police and bar associations 
developed and tested in three 
pilot sites a computerised system 
for selecting lawyers in order 
to exclude the possibility of the 
police choosing non-independent 
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In 2014, the Hungarian Helsinki Committee along with 
three other well-established Hungarian NGOs published 
a comprehensive assessment of the disrespect for 
European values in Hungary. The report cast terribly 
worrying light on four dimensions: the rule of law, 
democracy, pluralism and fundamental rights.
As an example of the breaches to the rule of law, the 
report stresses the fact that the “government has 
systematically undermined the role of independent 
institutions as checks on and balances to political power 
by means of restructuring as well as re-staffing these 
institutions. The governing majority, in order to appoint 
loyal office-holders, removed the previous incumbents 
from office before their terms expired.”
Core principles of democracy are also jeopardised, the 
report highlights that “Hungarian elections remained free 
but became unfair”. Due to highly restrictive campaign 
regulations, and pro-government public media, Fidesz 
enjoyed an undue advantage over the other political 
parties. And this is only one among many other significant 
cracks in the democratic structure: limited parliamentary 
debates, biased new constituency map, threat on 
Members of Parliament, pressure and constraints on 
freedom of press and media.
These attacks on democracy trickled down to pluralism 
of Hungarian society. Not only the necessary work of 
NGO has been severely threatened and attack but the 
Hungarian state has adopted a not neutral ideological 
point of view which poses serious problems to education. 
Local government schools are taken over by churches, 
religious education 
is funded from state 
budget and schools no 
longer have to strive to 
be ideologically neutral. 
Not only institutions are 
affected by restriction on 
a pluralist society. Very 
strong stance against 
same-sex marriage and a 
restrictive understanding 
of the concept of family 
have been enshrined in 
the Fundamental Law and 
Civil Code.
Finally, outrageous breaches to fundamental rights 
through measures severely violating human dignity, and 
afflicting the most defenceless has been taken since 
2010. Confinement 




limitation of the 
freedom of speech, 
degraded right to 
access social security 
services can be quoted 
as most striking 
examples among many 
more.
In the light of this stark 
disrespect for European 
values and Human 
rights, it barely came as 
a surprise when Orban 
declared “We have one 
message for refugees: 
Don’t come!” during 
a press conference 
in Brussels on September 3rd 2015. Since then, the 
Hungarian Helsinki Committee has restlessly fought more 
than ever to safeguard the rights of refugees in Hungary 
and to raise awareness about unprecedented human 
rights violations in Hungary. 
orban declared 
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i s the “illiberal State” a European tendency, growing in the respective Member States? Is democratic 
disenchantment a phenomena Europe 
itself is confronted to, namely in light of the 
100 Euro-sceptics who recently entered 
Parliament? What European responses to 
systematic attacks by a Member State against 






By Dr. Vedran Dzihic 
it seemed to be a wonderful dream of a world and particularly Europe reaching the end of history (Francis 
Fukuyama) and entering an era of ev-
erlasting liberal democratic peace. In 
some parts of Europe it worked out 
quite well, at least for a period of time. 
Today, the situation in (some parts of) 
Europe is rather dramatic, with some 
major challenges and conflicting trends 
portraying a picture of a rather divided 
than continent united in peace. There 
is even a risk of European parts drifting 
apart, having one part of Europe ded-
icated to liberalism, democracy and 
openness and another one embrac-
ing authoritarian values and illiberal-
ism. As Michael Ignatieff put it in New 
York Review thinking of global devel-
opments but portraying besides China 
mainly Russia and Turkey: “A new po-
litical competitor to liberal democracy 
began to take shape: authoritarian in 
The global economic crisis 
has revealed the fragility of 
the political and socio-
economic systems and 
jeopardized a democratic 
consensus.
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political form, capitalist in economics, 
and nationalists in ideology.”1
The global economic crisis has re-
vealed the fragility of the political and 
socio-economic systems and jeopard-
ized a democratic consensus. As Jan 
Werner-Müller has put it “democracy is 
struggling: nearly all the countries that 
joined the EU during the last decade 
are experiencing profound political cri-
sis.”2 25 years after the end of the Cold 
War, initial euphoria about democrat-
ic change in many countries of the East 
and Southeast has given way to growing 
mistrust in political institutions and po-
litical representatives, and an increasing 
disaffection with democracy itself. What 
we face in the West is a rather broad dis-
cussion about crisis of democracy, while 
at the same time in some Eastern and 
Southeastern European countries re-
gression from democracy and authori-
tarian trends are on the agenda. 
With the general crisis of democracy 
in the inner circle of democracies we face 
an emergence of grey-zones between 
democracy and authoritarianism and 
new forms of authoritarianism in some 
parts of Eastern and Southeastern 
Europe, and even within the EU. 
Classical authoritarianism seeks for an 
absolute obedience, is directed against 
individual freedoms and liberties and 
always ready to use repression against 
opponents. New grey-zone regimes 
are chameleon-like – they are able 
to adjust to new circumstances, they 
have institutionalized representation 
of a variety of actors and they even 
incorporate some democratic procedures 
like elections and thus create a structure 
resistant to change. It is precisely this 
type of grey-zone chameleon-like 
regime that is setting an example for 
something we could describe as “illiberal 
democracy”. Sounds like a paradox, and 
it is a paradox from the standpoint of 
political theory, but it is a new reality 
emerging before our eyes.
lookIng at the perIpherIes 
of europe
In order to understand more about 
the direction Europe is heading to or 
about the challenges Europe is facing 
it is equally important to look at the 
peripheries of Europe as at the center. 
Looking at the peripheries of 
Europe might help us illustrate this 
assumption. The peripheries are zones 
of anger (as Sloterdijk has put it), where 
the perceptions of liberalism and open 
societies and thus also Europe are in a 
constant flux with no finality in sight. 
It is precisely in the peripheries that we 
see competing and conflicting narratives 
about liberalism and democracies and 
more generally conflicting narratives 
about the regimes best suited to rule. The 
one is basically oriented towards liberal 
and democratic values and another one 
heading towards authoritarian values. 
In between lies an explosive mix of 
uncertainty. And it is precisely in this 
zone “in-between” where fear is taking 
over, be it a tool for ruling parties and 
politicians to fortify their power or 
as a paralyzing momentum for whole 
societies, where citizens eyes wide shut 
because of fear start relaying on dubious 
leaders to provide guidance in difficult 
times. 
The best prove that there is some-
thing serious going on in Europe is to 
just quote usual opinion-leadings me-
dia outlets, here “The Economist”, 
which in its December edition puts it 
this way: “Mr Trump and Ms Le Pen are 
not alone. Support for the populist right 
in America and parts of Europe are un-
paralleled since the Second World War. 
Against the backdrop of terrorism, these 
fear mongers pose a serious threat to the 
openness and tolerance that Western 
societies take for granted.”3 And here is 
The Guardian telling us the same story: 
“A long malaise in continental liberal de-
mocracy is beginning to feel more like 
decline. Illiberal democracy is already 
1 Michael Ignatieff, New World 
Disorder, New York Review of 
Books, September 25 issue, 2014: 
2  Jan Werner-Müller, 
Eastern Europe Goes South. 
Disappearing democracy in 
the EU’s Newest Members, in: 








thriving in the east 
of the continent. It 
is the explicit creed 
of the Hungarian 
Prime Minister, 
Viktor Orbán, who 
has tried to pro-
scribe press criticism 
of the government in 
the name of protect-
ing “public morality”, 
and who treats non-
Christian religions and 
non-governmental or-
ganisations as fifth col-
umnists contaminating 
the vigour of a national 
project. (…) In October, the ultra-con-
servative Law and Justice party swept 
aside a centrist government in Poland, 
raising fears among the country’s liber-
als of a lurch towards Orbán.”4
There are many examples to illus-
trate this rift, be it Ukraine, Hungary, 
countries of the Western Balkans or 
even Bulgaria, recently Poland. As we 
have seen in the Ukrainian case, the 
drifting apart of parts of the country in 
terms of narratives about Europa and 
further integration into the EU quick-
ly translated into violent division of the 
country creating facts on the ground that 
are – most probably – here to stay (see 
Crimea). Parts of Southeastern Europe 
are also an interesting place to look at. 
Here we have fragile states 
with no solution for in-
ternal ethnic conflicts 
and disputes while at the 
same time regimes with 
strong (male) rule are 
emerging, pairing pop-
ulism and nationalism 
with quite of the emp-
ty rhetoric of reforms 
and Europeanization. 
Hungary that is, at least according to its 
Prime Minister Orban, embracing “il-
liberal democracy” and limiting some 
fundamental freedoms, or Bulgaria with 
constant parallelism between protests, 
elections and new governments not 
able to deliver what population seems 
to want, are further examples of fun-
damental changes going on in Europe 
nowadays. Or the latest addition to the 
debate of illiberalism, Poland, is in the 
midst of turbulent reshaping the state 
according to a rather questionable role-
model, Hungary.
To make my point – in Eastern- 
und Southeastern part of Europe, not to 
speak about Russia or Turkey, in a region 
that went through more than two dec-
ades of democratization, we are witness-
ing new challenges to democracy and 
emergence of grey zone semi-authori-
tarian regimes, which – under the guise 
of democracy – limit individual freedom 
and reduce liberties.
re-thInkIng grey-Zone 
regImes and Zones 
“In-between” 
The development of new grey-zone re-
gimes between democracy and authori-
tarianism in Eastern- and South-eastern 
part of Europe certainly goes hand in 
hand with weaknesses of democracy, 
particularly in transitional societies that 
left authoritarianism at the beginning of 
the 1990s and embarked on a challeng-
ing way towards the end goal, the liber-
al Western type democracy as embodied 
in the EU. Let us look briefly on major 
dilemmas of this “transition-to-democ-
racy” dilemma. 
The “classical” assumptions of 
transformation research holds onto a 
picture a linear and normatively given di-
rection of democratic transformation. It 
is supposed to progress in clearly distin-
guished phases from democratic open-
ing to gradual consolidation up until the 
final goal of Western oriented liberal de-
mocracy. This model has been repeatedly 
We face 





and new forms 
of authoritarianism
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East and Southeast Europe since 1990. It 
means that assumption of an automatic, 
inevitable consolidation of democracy is 
misguided, especially since some states 
with a rather linear and stable process 
of consolidation of democracy started 
facing processes of de-democratization 
or regression from democracy. And here 
obviously Hungary and recently Poland 
are major examples for such a kind of de-
velopment. So Andras Bozoki:
“From the happy story of the tran-
sition from dictatorship to democracy, 
there is a looming potential tragedy, a 
transition from democracy. The last 
twenty years were far from being un-
problematic, prime examples: a widen-
ing gap between the winners and losers 
of the regime change, between the liv-
ing standards of 
the capital city, 
Budapest, and the 
rest of the country, 
and between the life 
chances of educated 
classes and the Roma 
population.  But still, 
what we all experi-
enced was a genu-
ine liberal democracy.  
Governing parties lost 
elections.   The media 
aggressively criticized 
politicians. Democracy 
was consolidated, and 
the country successful-
ly joined the European 
Union. Is it possible to 
take the oxygen of de-
mocracy away within a few weeks and 
months? Moreover: Is it possible to make 
a reverse transition?”6
Consequently, having these new 
trends in mind several common as-
sumptions of the democratization theo-
ry have been revised. A core assumption 
of Western liberal democracies being a 
normative role model for countries in 
Eastern and South-eastern Europe has 
lost a lot of its original credibility. The 
latest debates about post-democracy 
and crises of democracy (see authors 
like Crouch, Fukuyama, Rosanvallon, 
etc.) underline the fact that the crisis of 
democracy in the West, and particular-
ly within the EU, has changed the per-
ception of democracy in the periphery 
of the West. Another important assump-
tion related to the importance of free 
and multiparty elections for democrat-
ic consolidation was chal-
lenged by scholars arguing 
that free and fair conduct-
ed elections are a necessary 
but not sufficient condition 
of liberal democracies. The 
reduction of the concept 
of democracy to a pure 
The crisis 
of democracy  
in the West, 
and particularly 
within the EU, 
has changed 
the perception 
of democracy  
in the periphery 
of the West
criticized and revised over the last dec-
ades. The functional weakness of democ-
racies in East and Southeast Europe is a 
convincing case for the revised insight 
that there is no linear pathway to de-
mocracy. But rather that transition to 
democracy is also always a transition 
from democracy, or even a regression of 
democracy. The significant problems of 
democracies and worrying authoritar-
ian trends in the countries of Eastern 
and South-eastern Europe can thus be 
seen as a clear proof to the assumption 
that there is no linear path to democracy 
and that democratization efforts in some 
cases can even lead to non-democratic 
effects including democratic roll-backs 
and also regression from democracy. As 
Charley Tilly put it in the early 2000s, 
“de-democratization” seems to be im-
manent to any kind of democratization.5 
It became increasingly clear that liber-
al democracy is only one possible final 
outcome of democratization processes. 
I argue that there is no automatism in 
democratic transition, yet an inherent 
contingency of transformation process-
es as well as an enormous divergence of 
political system that have developed in 
4 The Guardian, Rafael Behr, 
As Le Pen rises Europe’s liberal 
dream is disappearing in front of 
our eyes, 9.12.2015
5 Charles Tilly, Democracy, 
Cambridge University Press 
2007
6 Bozoki, Andras, The 
Hungarian Shock: Transition 
from Democracy, in: Transit 






electoralism has certainly led to signifi-
cant problems. By putting a strong focus 
on the importance of elections, the im-
portance of other elements of democra-
cy as for example the active participation 
of citizens, the functioning of the state, 
or the redistributive ability of the welfare 
state was largely underestimated.
Based on these deficiencies, the 
debate obviously shifted towards the 
debate on regression from democracy 
and towards concepts like “grey-zone”-
regimes between democratic and 
authoritarian rule. Just to briefly recall 
major arguments in the debate. The 
early debate on de-democratization 
was dominated by the concepts of 
“defective democracies” and on 
“hybrid regimes”. Then Thomas 
Carothers sparked an important debate 
by developing a concept of feckless 
pluralism, best described as pluralistic 
grey zone regime types outside of the 
“democracy vs. autocracy”-logic that can 
be politically quite stable and produce 
an output valuable for the citizens 
without necessarily following the logic 
of democratic rule. 
“Countries whose political life is 
marked by feckless pluralism tend to 
have significant amounts of political 
freedom, regular elections, and alter-
nation of power between genuinely dif-
ferent political groupings. Despite these 
positive features, however, democracy 
remains shallow and troubled. Political 
participation, though broad at election 
time, extends little beyond voting. (…) 
Political elites from all the major par-
ties are widely perceived as corrupt, 
self-interested, dishonest, and not se-
rious about working for their country. 
The public is seriously disaffected from 
politics, and while it may still cling to a 
belief in the ideal of democracy, it is ex-
tremely unhappy about the political life 
of the country. Overall, politics is wide-
ly seen as a stale, corrupt, elite-domi-
nated domain that 
delivers little good 
to the country and 
commands equal-
ly little respect. And 
the state remains per-
sistently weak.”7 
The concept of Thomas Carothers 
seems to offer an appropriate framework 
for looking at today’s grey zones be-
tween democracy and authoritarianism 
in Eastern and South-eastern Europe but 
also much broader, be it for example in 
Turkey and to a certain extent in Russia 
too. Here is what can be identified as ma-
jor characteristics of this newly emerg-
ing “in-between” regime type. Grey zone 
regimes are generally characterized by a 
partial incorporation or imitation of lib-
eral democratic procedures and formal 
institutions, which are however simul-
taneously undermined by an overall log-
ic of limited pluralism. That means that 
we find here new forms of regimes that 
do reconcile competitive elections, mul-
ti-party systems, parliaments, constitu-
tions and other elements of rule usually 
associated with liberal democracies on 










lapsing back into 
authoritarian rule
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logic of authoritarianism and with mech-
anisms and techniques of rule (including 
open or subtle repression) characteris-
tic for authoritarian regimes. These re-
gimes are also having a high degree of 
adaptability and strategic changeabili-
ty and flexibility: they for example refer 
to themselves not as authoritarian but 
thoroughly democratic. They also have 
long ago adjusted to the rules of glob-
al capitalism in which they fully par-
ticipate. Such a high grade of flexibility 
is even “better at picking up tips from 
their democratic rivals than the oth-
er way around.”8 Russia in the context 
of the current context of Ukraine and 
Western sanctions might stand as an 
example here. 
But let us take a closer look at the in-
ternal logic of rule of grey zone regimes 
and thus summarize major features of 
these regimes.  First of all, those regimes 
create a façade of formal democratic ele-
ments and even rule of law. They seek to 
underline their democratic character by 
a strong declarative and rhetorical com-
mitment to democracy, which is how-
ever undermined by nearly every aspect 
of the day-to-day functioning of the re-
gime. There are several areas where the 
authoritarian character of the regime 
can be detected: it starts at the level of 
participation, where 
elections are either 
slightly or strong-
ly manipulated by the 
regime, and where 
media are shameless-
ly used for political ex-
ploitation and election 
advertising. Secondly, 
courts, which are de jure 
independent, are de facto politically con-
trolled or dominated by the executive 
branch of government. Judiciary is usu-
ally the first segment to be “attacked” 
by new authoritarian leaders, as seen in 
Hungary and as we are witnessing right 
now in Poland. Thirdly, although govern-
ment has all rights to exercise the pow-
er, several informal and democratically 
non-legitimate actors such as econom-
ic oligarchs and businesses, religious 
leaders and other clientelistic groups 
claim the control over certain policies 
for themselves. Quite frequently ethnic 
or national issues or questions of terri-
tory and national sovereignty are used 
by the regime as a “scapegoat” to mobi-
lize voters or divert attention from their 
own particular interests and non-demo-
cratic and non-transparent practices. A 
final and very important element for an-
alysing grey zone regimes is the mutual 
relationship between political elites and 
citizens. In order to keep the democrat-
ic façade alive and continue operating in 
the grey zone between democracy and 
direct authoritarian rule the grey zones 
regime need to keep a certain level of 
popular support. How and with which 
means a necessary level of popular sup-
port is achieved by grey zone regimes 
seems to be one of the crucial questions. 
As a result, at the time of general 
economic and social crisis and 
widespread crisis of democracy, the 
above described new authoritarian forms 
of rule start to be perceived as attractive, 
rather flexible and adaptable and finally 
functional system alternatives. It is 
precisely this new attractiveness, even 
a legitimacy and in any case flexibility 
paired with certain services provided 
to the population (such as security 
and welfare for certain parts of the 
population) that is endangering the 
liberal consensus and leading towards 
capitalist (or globalist) illiberalism as a 
new flexible and pragmatic ideology of 
21st century. 
The reduction 
of the concept 




led to significant 
problems
7 Carothers, Thomas (2002): 
The End of the Transition 
Paradigm, in: Journal of 
Democracy, Volume 13, Number 1 
January 2002
8 Runciman, David (2013): The 
Confidence Trap. A History of 
Democracy in Crisis from World 
I to Present, Princeton and 





- cIVIl socIety 
as a cure for 
IllIberalIsm?
In his above quoted arti-
cle in Foreign Affairs Jan 
Werner-Müller, follow-
ing a rather pessimistic 
overview about worrying 
trends in Eastern Europe, 
went on to search for pos-
sible alternatives to grow-
ing illiberal trends. And he found them 
in the “people”: 
“In the end, the people of eastern 
Europe may prove better than their po-
litical establishments. So far, not one of 
the profound constitutional changes in 
the region has been popularly ratified. 
The Fidesz constitution was never put 
to the people, and a referendum initiated 
by Romania’s Ponta to unseat the presi-
dent failed in 2012. Meanwhile, popular 
protests prevented the appointment of 
oligarchs to the Bulgarian government 
in 2013. On the streets of Sofia, students 
protesting the country’s oligarchs sang 
Western Europe’s cultural anthem: 
Beethoven’s “Ode to Joy.” In 1989, or-
dinary people and political dissidents 
managed to (in most cases) peacefully 
overthrow the oppressive governments 
of Eastern Europe in a series of “velvet 
revolutions.” Twenty-five years later, the 
people of the region must safeguard the 
legacy of their revolutions by once more 
showing such resolve - and blocking at-
tempts by Orban-style populists to now 
steal them.”
“People”, usually framed collec-
tively as civil society, play a key role as 
a democratic corrective force in all so-
cieties, and even more in those that un-
dergo a transition from an authoritarian 
regime to a liberal democ-
racy. The idea is basically 
that civil society is fun-
damentally contributing 
to develop and sustain-
ably embed a demo-
cratic political culture, 
thus preventing coun-
tries from lapsing 
back into authoritar-
ian rule. Against this 
The social protests
 









background, it is easier to understand 
why so much – and generally too much 
– is expected of civil society as a cure-
all, even more in times of illiberal chal-
lenges. In order to get a realistic picture 
of civil society and citizens’ movements, 
its role and potential as well as its limi-
tations, it is first of all essential to move 
away from over-simplified images of the 
civil society and hopes of salvation. Civil 
society is not always and automatically a 
cure for illiberalism and a guarantee for 
sustainable democratic development. 
But it times of new clashes within so-
cieties, in times where the front-lines 
between those defending values of liber-
alism and democracy and those negating 
and fighting them, are more and more 
visible and surrounded by conflicts, the 
“people” – be it assembled in the form 
of civil society or protest movements – 
becomes once again an agent of change 
or liberal resistance. This goes both for 
Eastern and South-eastern European 
countries but also for all Western coun-
tries facing crisis of democracy, extrem-
ist movements and ideologies, etc. 
One of major moments of chal-
lenging illiberalism, and we saw it from 
Hungary, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Bosnia, 
to Turkey or Ukraine, are the social and 
protest movements. Here in the past 
few years we have seen a new dimension 
and a new quality. The social protests, 
most of which we witnessed recently, 
are the most important development 
of democratic politics in the regimes 
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“Democracies exist 
and survive only 
because people wan
t 
and are willing 





sheer good luck 
are needed for 
them to prevail”
“in-between” in the past two decades. 
Let take the example of the Balkan’s 
countries. Part of the process of growing 
up and emancipation of civil societies in 
the Balkans is the action taken by the cit-
izens of many states in the region, who 
are vociferously telling irresponsible pol-
iticians that they will no longer tolerate 
political injustices, taking to the streets 
to protest against elite-dominated and 
corrupt, yet seemingly democratic re-
gimes, exposing problems and those re-
sponsible for them and trying to combat 
them. Just few examples: We saw massive 
protests in Bosnia, where despite of the 
often-criticised inter-ethnic friction (es-
pecially within the power elites) a large 
and cross-ethnic movement emerged in 
the early summer of 2013. Starting from 
a concrete case, the protests widened to 
bring about a comprehensive critique 
of the regime’s incompetency to solve 
problems. Another huge wave of pro-
tests arose in February 2014, followed 
by the formation of peoples’ assemblies. 
Similarly in Macedonia, where the end 
of 2014 and the beginning of 2015 saw 
five protests taking place in the country, 
accompanied 
by the rise of plenums. The recent pro-
tests (spring and summer 2015) directed 
against the government led by Gruevski 
represented different civil society actors 
and interests, showing a congruence of 
oppositional attitudes accompanied 
with a strong quest for deeper democ-
ratization of the society. And we could go 
on with Kosovo, recently Montenegro, 
Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Moldavia, 
Turkey, previously Ukraine, Croatia, 
Slovenia, etc.
The political establishment, howev-
er, is fighting back against these new so-
cial movements with all its might. There 
are plenty of role models for authoritari-
an rulers, such as Putin or Erdogan, who 
only know the force of repres-
sion, the police and the deeply 
symbolic water cannons. When 
Gruevski allowed the police to 
use force against the protesters 
in Macedonia, this was noth-
ing less than an authoritari-
an reaction to a movement 
whose criticism had attacked 
the heart of the regime. The 
process of critically questioning and 
challenging bad politics in Eastern and 
South-eastern Europe can ultimately 
lead to more freedom and a better life in 
the region. This is hopefully also the pro-
cess of bringing citizens back on a larger 
scale. What is needed is to put the pic-
ture upside down and instead of loocking 
at institutional arrangements and tech-
niques to retain power ask about rela-
tionship citizens have to the regime and 
consider them as a dynamic part of the 
game able to handle despite and besides 
the regime.
Finally, it might be labelled as na-
ïve to believe that citizens can change 
the course of developments and lead us 
back to the (re)establishment of broad 
democratic and liberal consensus. There 
are no guarantees that social movements 
will help us at all. Fukuyama in his recent-
ly published “Political order and political 
decay” argued: “Democracies exist and 
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survive only because people want and 
are willing to fight for them; leadership, 
organizational ability, and oftentimes 
sheer good luck are needed for them to 
prevail.” But in any case social and pro-
test movements, citizens’ action taken 
against “untouchable” political elites, 
against injustice, corruption, malfunc-
tioning of state and economy, and gen-
erally against illiberal trends spreading 
across the region under the guise of for-
mal democracy, are creating a momen-
tum of resistance against illiberalism and 
a new coalition assembled around values 
of open societies.  
role of actIVe cItIZens – 
towards an actIVe utopIa 
Recently, one of most important 
thinkers of our time, Zygmunt Bauman, 
published a short piece entitled „Quo 
Vadis, Europe“.9 Here he sees a set of 
challenges for Europe, one of the most 
prominent being the „neo-nationalist“ 
(we might call them authoritarian 
leaders of new era, far-right populist, 
new autocrats or despots, etc.) offering 
the phantom of national sovereignty as 
a cure for all ills. This is precisely where 
we can place Orbans, Erdogans, Le 
Pens or Kaczyński, all those opponents 
of liberalism, hiding declaratory 
behind democracy and undermining 
it fundamentally by the way they 
understand and perform politics. 
Back once again to Orban and 
Hungary. Following his victory in 2014 
elections and observing his behavior 
in the course of the recent refugee cri-
sis, there is a worrying self-confidence 
he displays. Looking at Poland it seems 
that Orban’s thinking about democracy 
and liberalism is becoming influential 
IllIBeral Democracy
the term “Illiberal Democracy”, coined in 1997 by Fareed Zakaria in the journal Foreign Affairs, 
surprisingly came into fashion again in 2014 when 
used by one of the EU Member States leaders. After 
his re-election for a second four-year term, and 
now almighty in Hungary, Viktor Orban confidently 
proclaimed: “I don’t think that our European Union 
membership precludes us from building an illiberal 
new state”. As Zakaria noticed in 1997, in most Western 
countries, democracy has meant liberal democracy, a 
system marked by free and fair elections, the rule of 
law, separation of powers, the safeguarding of basic 
liberties of speech, assembly, religion and property. 
However, as Zakaria continues, “illiberal democracies 
gain legitimacy, and thus strength from the fact that 
they are reasonably democratic. Conversely, the greatest 
danger that illiberal democracy poses -- other than to its 
own people -- is that it will discredit liberal democracy 
itself, casting a shadow on democratic governance.” 
The Hungarian case, a country with a democratically 
elected government, is a striking example of the concept 
described in Zakaria’s paper, imposing restriction 
on civic space, threatening basic rights, limiting the 
independence of justice and jeopardising the functioning 
of NGOs. 
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9 Zygmunt Bauman: Quo Vadis, 
Europe?, in: IEMED, Quaderns de 








11  Zygmunt Bauman: Quo 
Vadis, Europe?, in: IEMED, 
Quaderns de la Mediterraniar 
22/2015, p. 81
West and new rise of authoritarianism in 
Russia, Turkey, Hungary etc. paves the 
way for anti-democratic thinking and 
grey zone political practices even with-
in EU and puts democracy under attack. 
Such a new discourse and political prac-
tice might further damage the role mod-
el function of the EU und put democracy 
and liberalism not only in Europe but on 
a global scale under constant attack.
One of very important question in 
this context is whether the new social 
forms of protest, and resistance against 
new authoritarian-type of politics and 
political leadership spreading across 
Europe, will be able to persist and to 
transform into new emancipatory polit-
ical force able to shape European socie-
ties more fundamentally. The new social 
movements are fought by the political 
establishment for a simple reason – they 
dare to questions the new authoritarian 
obvious and to offer alternatives. Active 
citizens, be it in the social movements 
or other formations of civil society, are 
struggling to be actors of an active uto-
pia. And here I borrow again words from 
Bauman: 
“Perhaps the idea of Europe was and 
remains a utopia... But it has been and 
remains an active utopia, struggling to 
coalesce and consolidate the otherwise 
disconnected, multidirectional actions. 
How active that utopia turns out to be 
will depend ultimately on its actors”11 
even globally paving way to the con-
ceptualization and the justification of 
various forms of illiberalism and com-
petitive authoritarianism. In his infa-
mous speech (26th of July 2014) at the 
25th Balvanyos Summer Free University 
and Student Camp in Romania10, where 
he openly challenged the very principles 
of liberal democracy, he explicitly men-
tioned Singapore, China, India, Russia 
and Turkey as examples to make his 
point. By preaching illiberalism Orban 
seems to follow the thesis about illiber-
alism formulated by Fareed Zakaria back 
in 1997 in Foreign Affairs. Yet, there is 
something that makes the argument dif-
ferent from Zakaria’s general point and 
at the same time politically dangerous. 
Promoting illiberalism by elected lead-
ers from one of the member states of the 






orbAn’s EuropE lEft unchEckEd
By lorenzo marsili and Niccolo milanese
orban has become the figurehead of a vision of Europe which is white, Christian, defensive, authoritarian 
and in which fundamental rights and 
liberties are at high risk. Whilst current-
ly amongst European countries only 
Orban’s Fidesz party enjoys the super-
majority that has allowed it to take deci-
sions and make constitutional changes 
which tend towards making this vision 
a political reality, leaving this power 
insufficiently checked over the past 5 
years has led to a situation where the 
international appeal of this model has 
grown substantially.
In reality, Orban’s vision for Europe 
was never an isolated case: the strategy 
of the Hungarian government to justify 
to the European Union changes to the 
constitution, to the judiciary, to the in-
dependence of the media, and in clos-
ing the civic space for free association 
and free speech, has consistently been 
The growing paradox of the 
European Union is we have 
tools to encourage 
fundamental rights and 
values in candidate states, 
but very few tools to 
safeguard them in member 
countries.
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and raids of civil society organisations and 
journalists, adds up to a systemic attempt 
to create an illiberal, intolerant regime.
The Hungarian government has also 
been adept at changing its legislation in 
‘negotiation’ with the Council of Europe 
and the European Commission to meet 
minimum standards and maintain the 
semblance of respecting European rules. 
An example is given by the EU intervention 
on the sudden reduction of the mandatory 
retirement age of constitutional court 
judges in Hungary. The EU has judged the 
policy to be in violation of the acquired 
rights of the judges who had been forced 
to retire, and ordered Hungary to pay 
due compensation to the fired judges. 
And Hungary paid gladly. The point, 
in fact, was not about the technicality 
of retirement age, but about freeing 
the constitutional court from judges 
nominated by previous governments and 
unfaithful to the ruling party - which the 
Orban government succeeded in doing, 
all the while appearing to respect and give 
in to the demands of the EU. 
This is why any process to rein in 
breaches of fundamental rights of a 
systemic nature in member states requires 
a political as well as a technical sensibility. 
Beyond individual infringements and 
technical amendments, monitoring 
the respect of fundamental values, 
democracy, and the rule of law in member 
states requires the capacity to assess 
when the whole is more than the sum of 
its parts - and act accordingly.  
The last few years have seen a 
significant increase of the formal and 
informal powers of EU-level bodies in 
monitoring and enforcing fiscal and 
financial policy in member states. Much 
less attention, however, has been paid to 
monitoring and enforcing the respect of 
citizenship and fundamental rights. This 
has led to a situation where the EU is 
increasingly perceived as the place where 
democratic governance and rights are 
undone, rather than safeguarded. How 
can the EU now transition from a space 
where only budget deficits are sanctioned 
to a space where equal weight is placed on 
sanctioning liberties and rights? 
We cannot be hopeful that the 
change will come just by itself, or 
through the goodwill of the European 
institutions. Even the timid framework 
for the assessment of rights compliance 
to point to other examples of similar re-
forms or practices which have gone un-
challenged in other European countries. 
Whether it is the intimidation of the me-
dia and build-up of media monopolies 
in Italy, the expulsion of the Roma from 
France, educational separation of Roma 
in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, or 
challenges to the independence of the ju-
diciary in Romania, Orban’s government 
has been adept at searching for European 
precedents for its actions. 
Analysts have nicknamed this 
a “Frankenstein state”, or a state 
constructed by piecing together the worst 
practices found in different EU member 
states. Beyond individual infringements, 
crucially, the overall picture of reforms 
and changes, along with the intimidating 
rhetoric and at times forceful intimidation 
42
ActivizEnship #2
proposed by the European Commission 
has been rebuffed by the Council. 
In a nutshell, this was composed of a 
three-steps approach: 
1. The Commission would first have to as-
sess whether there are clear, preliminary 
indications of a systemic threat to the rule 
of law in a particular Member State and 
send a ‘rule of law opinion’ to the govern-
ment of this Member State should it be of 
the opinion that there are;
2. Commission’s recommendation: In a 
situation where no appropriate actions 
are taken, a ‘rule of law recommenda-
tion’ may be addressed to the author-
ities of this country, with the option of 
including specific indications on ways and 
measures to resolve the situation within 
a prescribed deadline; 
3. Finally, the Commission would be 
supposed to monitor how the relevant 
Member State is implementing the rec-
ommendation mentioned above. Should 
there be no satisfactory implementa-
tion, the Commission would then have 
the possibility to trigger the application 
of Article 7 TEU, which would suspend 
the voting rights of the country in the 
European Council.
The ‘article 7’ procedure has been 
at the heart of discussions about how 
the European Union should deal with 
fundamental rights breaches. Sometimes 
called the ‘nuclear option’, it has 
frequently been argued that suspending 
the voting rights of a country is too big 
a step, and risks alienating a country 
entirely. The sole time the procedure has 
been used, when Jorg Haider’s Freedom 
Party looked set to join the ruling 
coalition in Austria in 2000, gave the 
European institutions a ‘hangover’ that 
seems to make them strongly reluctant 
to use the power again. There is a strong 
fear of pitting national executives against 
one another, and undoing the delicate 
balancing acts required for national 
sovereignty to be shared.
Other procedures and forms of 
penalties have been proposed. The 
scholar Kim lane Schepple has proposed 
lorenzo marsili is 
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European Media Initiative. 
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between cultural 
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founding editor of Naked 
Punch magazine.
niccolo milanese is 
co-founder and Chair of 
European Alternatives. 
He is part of the elected 
steering committees of 
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a more democratic EU. 
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British Council, the Goethe 
Institute and the Open 
University.
ThE aUThorS 
that the Commission should be able to 
launch infringement proceedings under 
article 2 of the treaties, which guarantees 
the values of respect for human dignity, 
freedom, democracy, equality, the rule 
of law and respect for human rights, 
including the rights of persons belonging 
to minorities. These values are common 
to the Member States in a society in which 
pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, 
justice, solidarity and equality between 
women and men prevail. 
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artIcle 7 of the lIsBoN treaty – 
aND other INstItutIoNal respoNses  
to the huNgarIaN case
encart: Article 7 of the Lisbon treaty – and other institutional responses to the Hungarian case
As early as 2013, the situation in Hungary has been 
pointed out by European Institutions. The European 
Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and 
Home Affairs “report on the situation of fundamental 
rights: standards and practices in Hungary” published 
by MEP Rui Tavares in June 2013 called on clear actions 
to be taken in order to protect the rule of law and 
fundamental rights in Hungary. 
Additionally, the Venice Commission of the Council 
of Europe, a consultative body in the field of 
constitutional law, has expressed its concerns in several 
occasions. Notably regarding the media legislation and 
freedom of press. 
To all observers, it has become clear that Hungary’s 
recent laws breach EU Treaties and the EU Charter 
of Fundamental Rights. Most recently, the handling 
of the refugees’ crisis by the Hungarian government 
triggered criticisms from different sides of the political 
spectrum in Europe. Many activists and politicians 
called for sanctions against Orban’s government. 
However, European Institutions are at best slow to act, 
and more likely very reluctant to make use for the first 
time of article 7 of the Treaty of Lisbon. Article 7 allows 
sanctions against Member States who would present 
a “clear risk of a serious breach of the values referred 
in Article 2” of the Lisbon Treaty. Its activation would 
stripe off Hungary of its voting rights, one of the core 
EU membership rights. This unprecedented case has 
been referred as a “nuclear option” in the media. 
Article 2 lays the foundations of the democratic 
principles of the EU: “The Union is founded on 
the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, 
democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for 
human rights, including the rights of persons belonging 
to minorities. These values are common to the 
Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-
discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality 
between women and men prevail.”
On October 14 2015, the European Parliament’s Civil 
Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs Committee (LIBE) 
has rejected an initiative by the legislative body’s 
Liberal group to start an Article 7 procedure against 
Hungary, leaving Orban unchallenged both on his 
national soil and at the European level.
As recently as December 2015, the European 
Commission, through the voice of Commissioner for 
Justice Vera Jourova, reasserted its very cautious 
position regarding Hungary:  “As these concerns 
are being addressed by a range of infringement 
procedures, and as the Hungarian judiciary also has 
its role to play, the Commission found that conditions 
to start a rule of law framework procedure are not 
fulfilled”. 
By bundling together a group of indi-
vidual infringement actions under a pro-
cedure under article 2, the Commission 
would be drawing attention to a system-
ic risk to democracy and fundamental 
rights in a country, which small action 
on each individual complaint may not be 
enough to address. Furthermore, by plac-
ing the action on a legal and procedural 
footing through infringement proceed-
ings, the problematic ‘political’ dimen-
sion of the article 7 procedure may be 
partly mitigated. Finally, Schepple has 
proposed that there are several actions 
the Commission could take which do not 
involve suspending voting rights, but fo-
cus on financial penalties for the country, 
whether through fines, or through with-
holding of funding.
A more minor innovation would be 
to give the European Commission the 
power to freeze proposed legislation in-
itiated by member state governments 
where it suspects these might be in con-
travention of the treaties or charter of 
fundamental rights. A consistent problem 
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the europeaN cItIzeNs’ INItIatIVe 
oN meDIa pluralIsm
mediainitiative.eu
European Alternatives and Alliance Internationale de 
Journalistes have been working since 2010 towards 
the establishment of a European Initiative for 
Media Pluralism, a coalition promoting the idea that 
European institutions should safeguard the right to 
free, independent and pluralistic information. The 
European Initiative for Media Pluralism (EIMP) brings 
together organisations, media, and professional 
bodies from throughout Europe with the immediate 
purpose of running a European Citizens Initiative (ECI) 
demanding the implementation of an EU Directive on 
media pluralism. The ECI is a new tool of participatory 
democracy introduced from April 2012 by the Lisbon 
Treaty, which allows civil society coalitions to collect 
online and offline one million signatures in at least 7 
EU member states to present directly to the European 
Commission a proposal forming the base of an EU 
Directive, initiating a legislative process.
This ECI demanded a EU Directive indicating clearly:
F An effective legislation to prevent the 
concentration of media ownership and control of 
advertising;
F A guarantee of independence of supervisory 
bodies independent from political power;
F The definition of conflict of interest in order to 
avoid media moguls occupying high political office;
F A clear European monitoring systems to regularly 
check the health and independence of the media in the 
member States.
F Guidelines and best practice of new models of 
publishers sustainability to guarantee the quality of 
journalism and in support of those who work within the 
sector.
The ECI gathered 200 000 signatures throughout 
Europe. While this has been considered as a success, 
it shows the limitation of such a tool for citizens that 
requires at least a million signatures to be considered 
by European Institutions. 
or implemented, whilst investigations are 
made, would allow timely intervention.
Whatever one thinks of this timidity 
of the Commission in not following 
up on any of these possibilities, the 
debate highlights the growing paradox 
of the European Union having tools 
to encourage fundamental rights and 
values in its neighbourhood through 
the Copenhagen Criteria that candidate 
states need to fulfil to join the Union, but 
very few tools to safeguard fundamental 
rights in countries once they are inside 
the Union.
The Tavares report on the situation 
of the rule of law in Hungary adopted 
by the European Parliament in 2011 
suggested the creation of a Copenhagen 
Committee to monitor EU countries 
permanently on the basis of agreed 
criteria when it comes to adherence to the 
rule of law. Such a Committee may have 
an advantageous position if it is to some 
degree independent of other European 
institutions and outside of suspicions 
of political manoeuvres. Furthermore, 
by continually monitoring all European 
countries, it could avoid accusations of 
targeting only smaller or weaker countries 
(of course, it would have to show it is not 
doing this by highlighting issues also in 
larger countries).
The relative lack of political will to 
advance on a Copenhagen Commission, 
in dealing with the slide towards authori-
tarianism in Hungary is that the European 
processes are very long: by the time the 
European Commission or courts rule 
whether a proposed law is unacceptable 
or not, it has already been voted and start-
ed to be implemented. Even if the law is 
then amended or changed several years 
afterwards at European insistence, the 
society has already been moved further 
to the authoritarian right by the law. The 
power of the European institutions to 
freeze suspect laws before they are voted 
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Civil society itself couldn’t remain silent in front of the 
current threats to fundamental rights and freedom in 
Hungary. 
In 2014, the European Civic Forum along with other 
civil society platforms firmly campaigned during 
the parliamentary hearings against Tibor Navracsics 
designation as Commissioner for Citizenship portfolio. 
Mr. Navracsics has been a key proponent of policies 
implemented by the Hungarian government led by Viktor 
Orban that acted against European values.
Thanks to a handful of MEPs in the European Parliament 
Education and Culture Committee who took up ECF’s call 
and stood against Tibor Navracsics’ nomination, citizenship 
has finally been removed from his portfolio. 
Very recently, a new European Citizenship Initiative 
has been launched in the hope of gathering one million 
signatures before November 2016. A group of individual 
citizens from several EU countries decided to start the 
campaign claiming that “the response of the European 
Union has proven ineffective in stopping this drift toward 
authoritarianism and the situation clearly puts European 
democratic values at risk.” Their ambition is “to urge the 
European Commission to hold the Hungarian government 
to account for its violations of human rights and 
democratic values.” They call for European Institutions to 
activate the famous Article 7 of the Lisbon Treaty, paving 
the way for sanctions against Hungary. 
The Wake up Europe! Citizens’ initiative can be found here: 
http://act4democracy.eu 
To date, it has already been endorsed by several national 
and European individual NGOs and network. 
or give more powers to the already exist-
ing Fundamental Rights Agency to fulfil 
a similar role, are testament above all to 
the low priority placed on this issue by 
the dominant political forces at European 
level at the moment, but also perhaps to 
the fear amongst European leaders and 
decision-makers of provoking a populist 
or far right-wing backlash if the European 
institutions are seen to dictate to coun-
tries what rights have to be respected. 
Where the European leaders are willing 
to take this risk when it comes to fiscal 
policy, surely because they feel in a posi-
tion of strength with financial institutions 
alongside them, they are unwilling to take 
it when it comes to fundamental rights.
The only ways to improve this situa-
tion in addition to changing the balance 
of forces dominating the European insti-
tutions, is for citizens to show decisively 
that they will stand up for their rights. We 
have known for a long time that citizens’ 
rights very quickly fall into irrelevance if 
they are not consistently defended and 
advanced. We have seen over the past 
years how quickly a deterioration in de-
mocracy in one country spreads to other 
European countries: this should remind 
us of our common task to defend and ad-
vance fundamental rights throughout the 
Union consistently, to claim and enact 



































t he picture drawn in the first two chapters is not an optimistic one to say the least. But when looking around, 
a myriad of initiatives to revive democracy 
can be found all across Europe. This final 
chapter gives a voice to these initiatives 
bearer. They are all enthusiastic about sharing 
their actions, their point of view, their daily 
work for a more democratic Europe. Let’s 
hear about digital democracy, the commons, 






will the civic tech  
meet the desire?
By Valentin Chaput
Let’s imagine for a second that 80% of the French voters cast a blank vote during the next presidential elec-
tion. Unthinkable? Let’s remain cau-
tious: adding up the non-registered 
voters, abstainers and all blank and in-
valid votes of the recent regional elec-
tions in France, it becomes clear that 
citizens who do not find what they are 
looking for in the current political of-
fer represent an undisputable majority.
Without voters “playing the game”, 
what is left of a democratic system that 
bases its legitimacy upon election pro-
cesses? Who can still govern and how? 
These questions are the starting point 
of Seeing (2004), one of the last nov-
els of Nobel prize-winning author José 
Saramago (1922-2010). The plot starts 
with a political earthquake: 83% of the 
capital city voters cast a blank vote 
during a local election. In this fiction 
work, the expected democratic lucidity 
Citizens who do not find 
what they are looking for 
in the current political 
offer represent an 
undisputable majority.
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which promote open 
governance and civic-tech 
in France.  
within the ruling political class is miss-
ing, immediately chased by an author-
itarian reaction. The Prime Minister 
decrees state of siege and flies the cap-
ital to seat the Government in a city 
where the blank vote wave didn’t hap-
pen. Police forces begin spying on citi-
zens showing suspicious pride after the 
elections. Politicians attempt to trigger 
a slow anarchist deterioration of this 
pacifist citizens’ revolution, betting on 
the resurgence of a demand for authori-
ty. “People have to understand that they 
are not trustworthy anymore” summa-
rises the Defence Minister.  
Election after election, voters 
across the world are sending the 
message to their representatives that 
they are less and less worth of their 
constituents’ trust. Condemning both 
the growing elites’ concentration and 
their inability to govern a world made 
of imbalance and inequalities, an ever 
growing number of citizens notes the 
simultaneous loss of legitimacy and 
efficiency of their political leaders, from 
all parts of the ideological spectrum. 
This movement is not limited to France. 
All Western democracies are subject to 
this evolution, which combines a slow 
erosion of participation in elections 
and the rapid rise and growth of social 
and protest movements. The present 
article doesn’t aim at analysing the very 
diverse and deep-rooted causes of the 
confidence loss that led to the current 
democratic exhaustion. It rather aims at 
exploring the wide field of opportunities 
opened by the frenetic diversity of 
connected citizens’ initiatives. Under 
an optimistic and positive light, these 
phenomena open the possibility of a 
future “citizens’ coup ” – which political 
line still remains unclear. 
ciVic-tech wants to inVent 
inteRnet-eRa democRacy 
Surrounded by technologies allowing us 
to constantly share information without 
intermediaries, enabling us to publicly 
express our choices on all dimensions 
of our lives and offering opportunities 
to support projects that make sense to 
us, we cannot satisfy ourselves anymore 
with political decisions made without 
prior consultation and dialogue, 
implemented without transparency, and 
for which no one is held accountable for 
long years between two elections.
During the Global TED Conference 
in 2014, Argentinian political specialist, 
Pia Mancini summarized how 
anachronistic our political practices are 
through a striking catchphrase: “We are 
21st-century citizens, doing our very, 
very best to interact with 19th century-
designed institutions that are based on 
an information technology of the 15th 
century. If Internet is the new printing 
press, then what is democracy for the 
Internet era?”
While digital technology has trans-
formed almost all activities within our 
societies in less than a quarter of a 
century, it is very surprising that the 
political world hasn’t been “disrupt-
ed” that much by these technological 
evolutions. Yet, politics are well pre-
sent on-line since the very beginning 
of mass Internet. The very first steps 
are summed up in the article How 
Technology Changed American Politics 
in the Internet Age by Steven Davy (@
































Projects enabling bottom-up 
reform through peer-to-peer 
information sharing, funding and 
collaboration to address civic 
issues
open government
Projects enabling top down change 
through the promotion of:
+  government transparency
+  accessibility of government data 
and services
+  promotion of civic involvement 








lic.com/] was opened as 
early as 1997. A year later, Joan Blades 
and Wes Boyd, a couple of tech entre-
preneurs from San Francisco Bay were 
creating the information sharing plat-
form MoveOn.org to mobilise pro-
gressive citizens as a response to the 
impeachment procedure targeting Bill 
Clinton amidst the Lewinsky case.  Still 
active today, the platform MoveOn.org 
[http://front.moveon.org/], working un-
der the motto “Democracy in Action”, 
has been a pioneer in terms of peti-
tions and political campaign funding 
for the democrats. Essential in the US 
political scene, fundraising has been 
taken to the next level thanks to the 
web. A 2000 New-York Times arti-




cain-overnight.html] by telling the 
story of John McCain’s fundraising suc-
cess story. After winning the republican 
primary in New Hampshire in February 
2000, the Senator of Arizona collect-
ed more than half a million dollars in 
less than 24 hours. A new breakthrough 
emerged in 2003 thanks to the innova-
tive campaign of democrat candidate 
Howard Dean. Among his innovations: 
A web TV, an embryonic social network, 
mass SMS-sending, and most impor-
tantly, a smart use of the 
newly created Meetup plat-
form [https://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/Meetup_(web-
site) ] allowing its sup-
porters to organise events 
all across the US. The 
very same year, the State 
of Arizona becomes the 
first state ever to allow 
online voters registra-
tion. Facebook (2004), 
Youtube (2004), and 
Twitter (2007) were 
yet to be invented. 
What happened next 
is well-known and well-documented: 
harnessing the power of big data at the 
service of gigantic and targeted door-
to-door campaign, the social network 
my.barackobama.com instigates a 
new era of militants’ organisation and 
contributes to a great extent to Barack 
Obama’s successful run for the White 
House in 2008. 
Voters’ mobilisation has been 
the central engine of the first decade 
of on-line political innovation. The 
next decade, which saw mass dem-
ocratic mobilisations in many coun-
tries against authoritarian regimes or 
against the consequences of the eco-
nomic crisis, also saw the rise of a new 
arsenal of “civic technologies”. These 
new civic-tech allowed change-mak-
ers to achieve a multiplying effect and 
to further experiment on-line politics. 
Defining precisely the limits of these 
new civic technologies is a challenge. 
During fall 2014, while Hong-Kong mo-
bile networks were jammed and under 
surveillance, the “Umbrella Movement” 
protesters used the French messaging 
application FireChat to communicate 





Without FireChat, the “Umbrella 
Movement” wouldn’t have lasted so 
long. The same observations have been 
made after the Arab Springs, sometimes 
nicknamed the “Facebook or Twitter 
revolutions”. Is this enough to change 
our social networks into efficient “civic-
tech” tools? Certainly not.
Developing the common good is 
the ultimate achievement for civic-
tech platforms. Yet, it is because of its 
inclusiveness that the notion of civic-
tech is used, instead of “eGovernance” 
of Gov 2.0”, a term supported by Tim 
O’Reilly in 2009. The Knight Foundation 
[@knightfdn] promotes innovations in 
media, arts and civic engagement in the 
US. The foundation mapped the US 
civic-tech ecosystems in 2013
This mapping distinguishes civic-














– open government and community ac-
tion. The two categories are then divid-
ed into several clusters.
In this classification, open govern-
ment gathers platforms aiming to:
Promote transparency and ac-
cess to public data such as the Open 
Data Institute, the Open Knowledge 
Foundation and the Sunlight 
Foundation;
Facilitate voters’ registration and 
call to vote such as Turbovote and 
Votizen;
Allow data visualisation and 
mapping through public accounts 
and institutions’ performance data 
analysing tools such as the tools offered 
by OpenGov.com;
Inform the general public and 
modernise public policies through data 
as offered by the Code for America and 
mySociety.org projects;
Allow citizens’ feedback and 
consultation. A field where Accela, a 
private company, is the leader on the 
US soil; 
 ɖ Facilitate public decision-making 
on consultative and participatory 
platforms.
Many more initiatives could be 
added to this list, developed and imple-
mented by institutions themselves. Be 
they open data portals at the local levels 
or 18F modernisation agency, which is 
part of the US government, or even the 
U.S. Digital Service, these super teams 
reinvent the way the White House is 
governing . The other branch identified 
by the Knight Foundation, “community 
action”, is even broader. It includes all 
community organising platforms, from 
the petition website Change.org to the 
campaign organiser Nation Builder, 
which are at the heart of today’s politi-
cal mobilisation campaigns. 
Surprisingly, sharing services are 
also included, from the collaborative 
GPS Waze, the neighbourhood 
community network NextDoor to the 
so-called “collaborative economy” 
giants such as AirBnB or Lyft and Uber. 
According to the Knight Foundation 
classification, AirBnB and Uber would 
be the largest civic-tech businesses 
in the world. This definition is not 
satisfactory. 
As a reference to the three-part 
motto “transparency, accountability, 
participation” that gives ground to the 
open gov approach, a more restrictive 
definition of civic-tech encompasses 
all public, private or third sector 
initiatives designed at reinforcing 
citizens’ engagement, democratic 
participation and government 
transparency. This approach allows 
uniting all projects using digital 
tools to individuals’ empowerment, 
campaigns’ organisation and collective 
decision-making as soon as they include 
a political dimension. Thus, online 
media, crowdfunding platforms, non-
political communication platforms, or 
tools such as Doodle (which allows a 
democratic choice for meeting time), 
are not to be considered as civic-tech 
tools. This clarification being done, 
a new typology emerges around what 
civic-tech can bring to democracy: 
solutions to understand, mobilise, 
select, decide and assess. 
apps aRe alReady changing 
ouR political expeRiences 
Among the variety of associative or 
start-ups’ projects emerging over the 
last years, the five selected French pro-
jects here illustrate the diversity of their 




by comparing them on Voxe.org
There is a feeling that politics made 
either by left or right-wing parties are 
quite the same, and this is a valuable 
and essential argument among non-
voters. Voxe.org team does not think 
so. Thus, they found out that, when 
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thoroughly analysing the different pro-
grammes, there are many distinctions 
to be done between the candidates and 
to vote for or against one of them. The 
problem is: the complete programmes 
are pages long and you only receive a 
short summary some days before the 
election. This analysis urged Voxe.org 
founders to create an open source com-
parison programme for the 2012 presi-
dential campaign. In only a few clicks, 
the elector chooses the candidates and 
policy areas he would like to compare 
and he then gets access to the pro-
grammes. Three years later, Voxe.org 
is used to cover elections in 15 coun-
tries and claims to have generated more 
than 3 million comparisons. Lately, ma-
jor French media used the comparator 
for the regional elections  and the plat-
form was visited more than 700 000 
times. Their ambition is clear – becom-
ing the first decision-making tool for 
the 2017 presidential election by adding 
new tools to the comparator in order 
to transform a consultation into a vote. 
Mobilising the citizens through 
online petitions with Change.org
Even though it is often denigrated as the 
most basic form of activism, petition 
remains the first online political tool. 
Petitions do have a real impact: Change.
org, world number one with 120 million 
users, boasts that its platform “produc-
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worldwide”. It is however regrettable 
that all the institutions do not respond 
with the same goodwill to citizens’ voic-
es expressed through this mean. While 
referenda make Switzerland so popu-
lar when speaking about Democracy, 
the 2008 revision of the Constitution 
in France imposed so many burdens to 
shared initiative referendum that it did 
not produce any concrete result yet. 
Since 2011 in the USA, the White House 
answered two hundred petitions which 
were signed by more than 100 000 sig-
natories. On the other hand, only three 
European Citizens’ Initiatives reached 
the million mark since 2012 and the 
the European Commission has no ob-
ligation at all to take any further com-
mitments related to successful ones. 
What is at stake is the capacity for civ-
ic-tech to enable citizens to initiate a 
true power balance against the politi-
cal establishment. MeuRio’s success in 
Brazil proves it: sixty local public pol-
icies were modified thanks to citizens’ 
active lobbying which literally flooded 
elected representatives, with more than 
200 000 registered participants on nos-
sascidades.org, a mobilisation platform.
Reshape representativeness with 
“enhanced representatives”: 
#MaVoix
The gap between politicians and voters 
seems too wide to be fixed. While voters 
lost the appetite for electing their rep-
resentatives, who lock out parties and 
monopolise terms for decades, they still 
feel proud when voting for legislative 
acts that concern them. Rather than 
founding a new political party, mem-
bers from #MaVoix launched a hack-
ing of 2017 legislative elections. Instead 
of the classical ego wars created by ex-
treme personalisation, #MaVoix aims at 
taking ordinary citizens to the National 
Assembly, previously training them 
through MOOCs and then selecting 
them by   random draw. The 
selected representatives 
will then relay for five 
years the decisions made 
by their constituents on 
an online platform. Even 
if the Constitution bans 
the use of binding man-
dates, the #MaVoix expe-
rience dares at least raising 
the issue of alternatives to a 
representative democracy. 
Expectations are high: the 
video uploaded on Facebook 
was seen more than 250 000 
times. 
Making better decisions 
together with DemocracyOS
Originally born in Argentina in 
2012, Democracy OS - an online 
space for deliberation and voting 
on political proposals – is present 
in France and Europe since 2015. 
Beyond the app’s easy display, its 
distinguishing factor lies into the choice 
of open source for running it. Opening 
the code guarantees the transparency 
of the tool and of the data to communi-
ties and users. Democracy OS was used 
by the end of 2015 to bring together cit-
izens from across 20 countries, who de-
bated about Climate Change, in parallel 
with the COP21. The platform was also 
adopted by Nanterre municipality for 
the management of the upcoming pub-
lic consultations. There are endless 
possibilities to use it, given that it is an 
open source code, which enables any-
one to set his own Democracy OS appli-
cation and so organise debates within a 
selected community. 
Assessing the parliamentarians’ 
action with websites developed 
by Regards Citoyens
Founded in 2009, the organisation 
Regards Citoyens is a pioneer in open 
governance and open data in France. 
Its most famous plat-
forms – nosdeputes.
fr and nossenateurs.
fr – are measuring 
the presence and 
activity of each par-
liamentarian, both 
in committees and 
in plenaries. Also 
Developing 





platforms. Yet,  
it is because of 
its inclusiveness 
that the notion 





3. rebuilding trust in democracy: 
motivated by the ambition of deliv-
ering a higher transparency, Regards 
Citoyens teamed up with Transparency 
International in 2010, in order to map 
all the lobbyists heard or met by par-
liamentarians prior to passing legis-
lation. Recently, la Fabrique de la Loi 
– created in partnership with Medialab 
from Sciences Po – offers an a posteri-
ori tracking of the latest legislative acts 
through each parliamentary step, from 
its introduction by the Government to 
its enactment, but also the reviews by 
the committees and the votes in each 
Chamber.
the stakes of democRatic 
tRansition thRough 
the digital technology
All civic-tech initiatives are not worth 
the same, whenever they come from in-
stitutional stakeholders, associations, 
private companies or political move-
ments. Those who expected that the 
Internet would revolutionise politics as 
quickly as it transformed the business 
sector and social relations may be dis-
appointed. Democracy can nevertheless 
have a significant future online if some 
conditions are fulfilled. The first one is 
about social: these tools will in fine suc-
ceed if they meet and strengthen on 
their way to digital innovation and ex-
periences renewal. Initiatives such as 
Démocratie Ouverte and Open Source 
Politics are precisely aiming at bringing 
closer project holders. The second con-
dition is more of an economic nature: 
all the models are currently tested, from 
the local organisation publishing its 
code in open source to the private busi-
ness selling the platform without any 
guarantee on what will happen with the 
collected database. Though, none of 
them gives a credible guarantee that it 
can survive economically. Whereas 
Forbes is convinced that civic-tech is 
the next big thing, notably given the $25 
billion invested in the sector in the U.S. 
this year, French and European actors 
need at least the same resources for 
their development. Finally, the third 
condition is political: project holders 
must keep in mind that a digital plat-
form will never be neutral and self-suf-
ficient. In order to make a real 
difference, civic-tech must absolutely 
be used as a service for reengaging pol-
itics in all abandoned or not integrated 
fields. These take the forms of local 
youth councils, parents, seniors or 
small communities, but organisations, 
businesses, public services and institu-
tions created to rule together the pub-





in crisis anD 
in transition
how can active citizenship 
be enabled and supported?
By Kevin Flanagan
europe is in crisis. It is a crisis of iden-tity. Earlier this year the Eurogroup of finance ministers threatened the 
Greek people with economic collapse. 
They refused to negotiate with Syriza 
on debt and forced the Greek people to 
accept further austerity. This mockery 
of democracy and national sovereignty 
revealed the emptiness of any rhetoric 
of European solidarity and the true alle-
giance of Europe’s political elite.
In their action and inaction, again 
and again politicians tell us that these 
faceless ‘markets’ are our masters now. 
They invoke ‘markets’ as if calling on 
some mystical force, they tell us to 
‘tighten our belts’ that we must offer 
sacrifice to inspire ‘confidence’ in the 
hope that we might receive blessings 
in the form of improved credit ratings.
You know that you are dealing with 
ideology when its logics (free mar-
kets  = free people) are blindly assumed 
It seems that there is little 
today that inspires 
confidence in European 
democracy.
In this Debt-tatorship, 
Democracy is only 
tolerated as long as it 
doesn’t interfere with 
hegemony of the markets.
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as norms. The markets cannot fail. This 
belief that there are no market failures, 
only human failures, and that the only 
solution to human failures are market 
solutions is the dead end of the Neo-
Liberal imaginary.
It was neo-liberal ideology of dereg-
ulation that led to the economic crisis 
but for Europe’s political elite to accept 
responsibility for their role in the cri-
sis would mean admitting they were 
wrong. Those in pow-
er cannot accept they 
were wrong for to do so 
could be perceived as a 
sign of weakness. So they 
reject this interpretation 
of events and work twice 
as hard to convince them-
selves and their peers that 
they were right all along 
by forcing more and more 
of their neoliberal fantasies 
on the rest of us.
Debt, debt and more 
debt. In this Debt-tatorship, 
Democracy is only tolerat-
ed as long as it doesn’t in-
terfere with hegemony of the 
markets.
When ideology failed to 
produce results, as it has, the so called 
‘centrist’ parties sought to distract 
people from the economy by blaming 
social ills on those 
least able to de-
fend themselves. 
Politicians talk 
tough and play a 
dangerous game 
of divide and 
rule. Pitching strug-
gling unemployed and working class 
people against minorities, migrants and 
refugees, ruling parties pandered to the 
sentiments of far right nationalists in 
turn giving legitimacy to their hateful 
narrative. The far right thrive on fear 
and uncertainty and depend on this to 
secure their path to power. As long as 
traditional establishment parties stay in 
power and continue to serve up more of 
the same zombie ideology, Europeans 
will continue to live with uncertainty.
It seems that there is little today 
that inspires confidence in European 
democracy.
Given the scale of the crisis it is un-
derstandable that many feel a deep cyn-
icism about the capacity of government 
to contribute anything more than to-
kenistic gestures of support for greater 
democratic participation, social justice 
or care for the environment. 
The lack of political imagination on 
the part of the establishment has con-
tributed to a weakening of democracy. 
However, flawed as it may be, if repre-
sentative democracy is rejected by so-
cial movements the seats of power will 
continue to be occupied by the forces 
of tedium. There is one simple solution 
to a democratic deficit and that is more 
democracy, not less.
I admit I too have been cynical but 
I have probably paid too much atten-
tion to mainstream news media. If there 
is anything that the past year tells us 
it is that for better or worse political 
culture can change. We may not hear 
about it in the national and interna-
tional news but at local, municipal and 
regional levels things are changing, cit-
izens are organising and taking action, 
building inspiring alternatives, putting 
radical participatory democracy into 
practice and making politics and econ-
omy work for their communities. There 
are many examples but I share here just 
a few that I have found personally in-
spiring in 2015.
As long as 
traditional 
establishment 
parties stay in 
power and continue
 
to serve up more of
 
the same zombie 
ideology, Europeans
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paRticipatoRy democRacy
To our collective detriment the 
electoral cycle keeps politicians minds 
focused on short term gains and quick 
wins. One size fits all government 
schemes almost inevitably run into 
conflicts. To overcome this it makes 
sense that the people most affected by 
decisions should have a say in the de-
cision making process. Participatory 
Democracy aims 
to give citizens a 
greater say in de-
cision making, it 
recognises the im-
portance of the prin-
ciple subsidiarity 
that nothing should 
be done by a large or-
ganization that can be 
done as well or better 
by a smaller and sim-
pler organization.
Putting legal mech-
anisms and structures in 
place that bridge this knowledge gap be-
tween citizens and government enables 
and empowers citizens to take a more 
active role in civic life. These efforts 
foster a culture of participation where 
citizens feel they have an impact and 
see the results in their communities. 
This is why participatory democracy is 
so important.
One of the most well-known mech-
anisms is participatory budgeting and 
it is being adopted in many places from 
small rural municipalities to major 
cities.
In 2014 the Mayor of Paris Anne 
Hidalgo committed 5% of the city’s 
budget an estimated €426 million over 
5 years to participatory budgeting. This 
is the largest amount that any govern-
ment has committed to participatory 
budgeting in history. Citizens’ initi-
atives that received support include 
community gardens, coworking space, 
composting and recycling initiatives, 
and more.
how can actiVe citizenship 
be enabled and suppoRted?
‘The Bologna Regulation for the Urban 
Commons’ is an inspiring document.
Its full title is the “Regulation on 
Collaboration between Citizens and the 
City for the Care and Regeneration of 
the Urban Commons”. Re-imagining 
the city as a Commons the 
document outlines how the 
city of Bologna provides a 
platform that enables and 
supports active citizen-
ship, citizen driven social 
innovation and vibrant 
creative cultural life.
In learning and 
sharing in each 
other’s experience 









3 . rebuilding trust in democracy: 
It is vital 
to recognise and 
show solidarity 
with all those that
 
dare to challenge 
the cynicism 
of our times 
What is it that citizens need for 
an active civic life? First of all the reg-
ulation provides a framework enabling 
local government, civic and cultural 
institutions and citizens to collaborate 
and work together. Through these part-
nerships structural support is provided 
to citizens initiatives this includes ac-
cess to work spaces, covering the costs 
of insurance, technical and adminis-
trative support, training and more. 
Neighbourhoods and citizens develop 
proposals for community and cultural 
initiatives or respond to tenders from 
local government to co-govern and co-
manage community assets, such 
as public spac-
es and amenities. 
Citizens are not 
solely consumers 
of public services, 
when they partici-
pate in the decision 
making and manage-
ment they inform the 
Their achievements expand the ho-
rizons of the political imaginary and 
open the possibility for a transforma-
tive participatory politics in Catalunya. 
Politics that places the welfare of all cit-
izens above narrow interests that serve 
only private profit and rent seeking. 
Barcelona En Comun is joined across 
Spain by parties such as Podemos that 
share a vision for a new kind of poli-
tics. With national elections these par-
ties aim to transform politics in Spain 
for the better.
It is vital to recognise and show sol-
idarity with all those that dare to chal-
lenge the cynicism of our times. Each of 
these examples offers a different ap-
proach, but all represent important 
steps towards a more inclusive politics 
and offer a glimpse of what democracy 
in Europe can be. In learning and shar-
ing in each other’s experience we can 
translate inspiration into action wher-
ever we live. 
provision of those services in way that 
responds much more effectively to local 
needs. In this vision Citizens are co-cre-
ators. The Civic space is a Commons.
municipal moVements
Few could have predicted that 
a housing activist could become the 
Mayor of Barcelona and yet this is what 
Ada Calou and Barcelona en Comun 
have done. Barcelona En Comun are 
deeply committed to radical democra-
cy this is most evident in their non-tra-
ditional party structure which includes 
a federation of neighbourhood assem-
blies. It was through participation in 
these assemblies that activist won the 
respect and confidence of citizens and 
it was this popular support that enabled 
them to win the election. During their 
short time in government Barcelona 
En Comun have made big changes in 
the provision of social housing and 
introduced protections for residents 
threatened with eviction 
by the banks. They also in-
troduced legislation that 
makes unused proper-
ties in the city available 




about democratic values and civic 
engagement
By Martina Horvat with the contribution of Saša Šegrt
Only a quarter of students 
in vocational programs and 
about one-third of all high 
school students in Croatia 
know the difference 
between the government 
and the opposition,
severe recession, followed by the Eurozone crisis and introduction of austerity measures have stimulated 
reactions across Europe, including the 
rise of the right-wing populism, ethnic 
and religious exclusiveness and hate 
speech rhetoric. This situation poses 
a threat for the existing level of liberal 
democratic standards and for the polit-
ical stability throughout Europe, as well 
as for the position and social inclusion 
of different minority groups. The arti-
cle brings out the questions about the 
liberal democratic values and civil en-
gagement in Croatia, especially con-
cerning youth. It provides an overview 
of different researches about civic com-
petences of youth in Croatia, includ-
ing values, attitudes and knowledge. 
Also, it provides information about the 
role and the importance of the educa-
tion system in developing civic compe-
tence and civil engagement of youth as 
63
3. rebuilding trust in democracy: 
one of resources for prevention of vi-
olence, extremism, poverty and social 
exclusion. 
social and ciVic 
competences of youth in 
cRoatia
Social and civic competences are de-
scribed, in European reference frame-
work on key competences for lifelong 
learning (Recommendation 2006/962/
EC, 18/12/2006), as one of the eight most 
important competences that should be 
developed through education and life-
long learning. Competence is defined 
as a combination of knowledge, skills 
and attitudes appropriate to the con-
text that are particularly necessary for 
personal fulfilment and development, 
social inclusion, active citizenship and 
employment. Social competence re-
fers to personal, interpersonal and in-
tercultural competence and all forms 
of behaviour that equips individuals 
to participate in an effective and con-
structive way in social and working life. 
It is linked to personal and social well-
being. Civic competence, and particu-
larly knowledge of social and political 
concepts and structures (democracy, 
justice, equality, citizenship and civ-
il rights), equips individuals to engage 
in active and democratic participation 
(Europa.eu, 2006).
Researches1 indicate a serious 
lack of political knowledge, including 
knowledge about democracy, human 
rights and basic political concepts such 
as definition of democracy or citizen-
ship and division of power. Some of the 
results show that: 
 ɖ only 14% of the students at the end 
of the elementary schooling (Spajić 
Vrkaš, 2014)  understand the role of 
citizens;
 ɖ half of the students at the end of 
the elementary schooling (Spajić Vrkaš, 
2014) and 18% after high school (GOOD 
Initiative, 2015) do not understand the 
division of power;
 ɖ around 63% of high school graduates 
recognized the definition of civil society 
organization but 20% of the high school 
graduates recognized that centres for 
social work are not non-governmental 
organizations (GOOD Initiative, 2015);
 ɖ the main elements of the state are 
correctly identified by approximately 
43% of high school graduates (GONG, 
2011), while the main elements of 
democracy are correctly identified by 
approximately 49% (GONG, 2011);
 ɖ about 31% of high school graduates 
(GONG, 2011) can recognize the 
meaning of the concept of legitimacy, 
while others do not know or they 
confuse legitimacy with legality;
 ɖ about 46% in 2011 (GONG, 2011) 
and 53% in 2015 (GOOD Initiative, 
2015) of high school graduates 
recognize the meaning of the 
term “political opposition”, but a 
considerable percentage of students 
confuse definitions of government 
and the opposition, which is especially 
characteristic of the three-year 
vocational school students, who in their 
program have the smallest amount of 
content that could be classified as 
political education. 
The fact that only a quarter of 
students in vocational programs 
and about one-third of all high 
school students in Croatia know the 
difference between the government 
and the opposition, can be regarded as 
a troubling indicator of the success of 
the education system in this cognitive 
dimension.
The results of the two rounds of 
research from 2011 and 2015 (GONG, 
2011, GOOD Initiative 2015) confirmed 
the connection between undemocrat-
ic attitudes and less knowledge about 
democratic institutions and process-
es and emphasised the importance of 
the cognitive component of democrat-
ic competence. Also, attitudes of youth 
tend to be more autocratic: one third 
of high school graduates believe that 
the main feature of a democratic order 
is not the right of the media and citi-
zens to freely criticize the work of the 
Government (GONG, 2011); 21% of high 
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school students think that opposition 
shouldn`t criticize the government.
Regarding values and attitudes, 
research results (Radin, 1988; Radin, 
2002; Ilišin, 2013; GONG, 2011; GOOD 
Initiative, 2015) show noticeable ten-
dencies towards higher individualistic 
success and fulfilment of materialistic 
needs. On the other hand, tendencies 
towards traditional values, especially 
concerning religion, authority and na-
tional and religious belonging are also 
noticeable. Around 40% high school 
graduates that participated in the re-
search think that Croatian tradition is 
richer than traditions of other nations 
and around 40% think that Croatian vet-
erans should not be prosecuted for war 
crimes (GONG, 2015). Almost 60% of 
respondents believe that Croatia needs 
a strong and not necessarily democrat-
ic leader, and almost 15% agrees with 
the statement that in certain circum-
stances a dictatorship is better form of 
government (2011). At the same time 
an extremely high percentage express-
es ambivalence or inadequate infor-
mation about specific historical events 
that included suffering of people, such 
as the rise of fascism, Shoah/Holocaust 
or other 2nd World War crimes (GOOD 
Initiative, 2015).
Only gender equality does not 
completely follow that pattern of re-
tradicionalization considering the 
social role of the woman, although 
around 44% of high school graduates 
who participated in the research 
agree that women are biologically 
predisposed to be better in activities 
with people (GOOD Initiative, 2015).
Research showed that youth ex-
presses some social distance or a lack 
of acceptance towards minority groups 
(LGBTIQ, Roma and religious minori-
ties). Around 48% of participants think 
that homosexuality is sickness. Around 
65% of students declaratively agree that 
it is necessary to protect the rights of 
national minorities, but when it comes 
to the protection of specific rights such 
as the right to minority language in pub-
lic institutions the level of support de-
creases to 22% (GOOD Initiative, 2015). 
The results of the research, together 
with a number of other social problems, 
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the authors 
such as participation of youth in vio-
lent incidents and hate speech against 
members of minority groups, addition-
ally indicate the presence of certain 
antidemocratic attitudes, values and 
behaviour patterns among the young. 
The majority of young people in Croatia 
express the highest levels of confidence 
only in their family and friends and they 
have very little confidence in social in-
stitutions. The level of confidence is 
also low towards people that are re-
ligiously and politically different. In 
accordance with that, the level of par-
ticipation in social and political life is 
low. Although, the majority of youth are 
ready to participate from time to time 
in humanitarian actions that include 
65
3. rebuilding trust in democracy: 
providing financial and material help 
for people in need. 
General attitudes towards 
EU are mostly positive or neutral 
(Eurobarometar, 2014) but ambivalent 
in the sense that the majority of youth 
that participated in the researches ex-
press opinion that EU membership did 
not bring any changes for the ordinary 
citizens in Croatia (around 57%, GOOD 
Initiative, 2015).
ciVic education in cRoatia
In formal education, subjects that con-
tribute to developing civic and polit-
ical competences of the students in 
Croatia are: Politics and Economy in 
high schools (for one year), Sociology 
(some high schools have it for one 
year). Also in first four grades of ele-
mentary school students have the sub-
ject called Nature and Society where 
they learn basic information about so-
ciety and environment. 
Civic, citizenship, human rights, 
political or global education are differ-
ent names for educational approaches 
that contribute to social and civic com-
petences of youth. Authors Safaric and 
Knezevic (2010:11) define education 
for human rights as “the process of ac-
quiring knowledge, attitudes, values 
and skills necessary for life in a dem-
ocratic, pluralistic society, based on 
respect for human rights and the con-
tinuous efforts of the individual and 
the community that this rights protec-
tion”. They emphasise that it is impor-
tant to encourage the development of 
the individual as an active participant of 
change, rather than as a passive victim 
of events that are hap-
pening around him. The 
right to education is one 
of the general, indivis-
ible and inalienable hu-
man rights, and as such 
represents an important 
instrument for enjoyment 
of all other rights and free-
doms. Consequently, the 
full realization of the right 
to education necessari-
ly implies learning for Human Rights 
(Safaric, Knezevic, 2010:11). Šalaj 
(2005) emphasizes important role of 
civic and political education for the fu-
ture of democratic political system that 
depends on the knowledge, skills and 
abilities of citizens to responsibly en-
gage in social life. 
The topics related to human rights 
and democracy started to be imple-
mented in Croatian educational sys-
tem in 1999, and civic education in 2012. 
Croatian membership in the Council of 
Europe (from 6/11/1996) had a stimulat-
ing effect on the status of human rights 
and democracy education in the educa-
tion system. Croatian Government es-
tablished the National Committee that 
developed the National Programme 
of Education for Human Rights and 
Democratic Citizenship. The National 
Programme consisted of: human rights 
education, education for democratic 
citizenship, identity and intercultur-
al education, education for peace and 
non-violent conflict resolution, edu-
cation for sustainable development, 
education to prevent prejudice and dis-
crimination and human rights law re-
search. It was implemented in 1999 as 
a non-obligatory topic with different 
choices for implementation. Together 
with the process of implementation, 
development of teaching materials 
started. As pointed out by Berto Šalaj 
(2005) the need to develop quality man-
uals for teachers was particularly im-
portant in this model were all teachers 
have the option to teach human rights 
and democracy education and do not 
have competences to do so. The main 
sources of information about how the 
National Programme was implement-
ed were the gathering called Smotra or-
ganized once each year where specific 














projects were presented. Besides that, 
it is only civil society organizations and 
researchers who monitored and con-
ducted research of the implementa-
tion and the influence of the program. 
The implementation of The National 
Programme was not systematic enough 
and all students did not have the pos-
sibility to participate. Research of the 
Centre for Human Rights, “Democracy 
and Human Rights in Primary Schools 
Theory and Practice” (2012:19) con-
ducted with the aim of evaluating the 
effects of the implementation of human 
rights and democracy education in ele-
mentary schools in Croatia and creating 
the recommendations for improve-
ments, indicated insufficient, non-sys-
tematic and unequal implementation 
of the National program. Research has 
shown that implementation depends on 
the individual engagement and compe-
tences of teachers. The implementation 
of the National Programme was not sys-
tematic and inadequately contributed 
to the building of democratic citizen-
ship competences, although the major-
ity of teachers, principals, students and 
parents consider topics from democra-
cy and human rights as the most impor-
tant parts of education. The teachers 
and principals did not feel sufficiently 
trained to successfully implement the 
education and had problems in find-
ing the spaces for organizing this kind 
of education. Analytical and normative 
study by the Centre for Peace Studies 
(Bužinkić, 2011) indicate the necessi-
ty of more systematic inclusion of ed-
ucation for peace and non-violence in 
the education system, and evaluation of 
that process and emphasizes the impor-
tance of democratization of education-
al institutions. 
Because of unsystematic imple-
mentation of the National Program, 
researchers, university professors and 
civil society organizations organized 
Initiative for quality and systematic 
introduction of human rights, democ-
racy and civic education in Croatian 
schools in 2008, that is still active to-
day and is known as GOOD initiative. 
Through advocacy and education-
al work, the Initiative encouraged the 
change in the approach to civic educa-
tion. The new  Curriculum of civic ed-
ucation, that included human rights, 
social, (inter)cultural, political, eco-
logical and economical dimensions, 
was developed and started with exper-
imental implementation in school year 
2012/2013  and 2013/2014 in 12 Croatian 
schools. The implementation of the 
Curriculum was predominantly cross-
curricular, but for some age groups 
Curriculum proposed the subject civic 
education. Experimental implementa-
tion was monitored and researched and 
support for the schools was organized. 
Research of experimental implementa-
tion of Curriculum for civic education 
(Croatian Youth Network and Centre 
for human rights of the Faculty for hu-
manities, 2014) showed the low level 
of competences of students as well as 
problems with the motivation and com-
petences of one part of the teachers. But 
it started to be noticeable through the 
experimental implementations that civ-
ic education contributes to better social 
relationships between students and be-
tween students and teachers. After ex-
perimental implementation experts 
from University, schools and civil soci-
ety agreed that the Curriculum of civic 
education needs to be implemented in 
all schools. Experts from the Ministry 
of science, education and sport togeth-
er with the Agency for teachers training 
developed different program for civ-
ic education and introduce it in school 
year 2014/15 and civil society together 
from GOOD initiative together with 
civic education experts criticise this 
program because it doesn`t bring nec-
essary changes considering topics and 
methods that will develop civic and so-
cial competences.
futuRe tendencies
Croatian youth follow the same 
pattern as the rest of the Croatian so-
ciety. They faced quick changes with 
political and economic insecurity so 
majority of them, frightened by the 
changes and diversity, turn to tradition-
al values, religion and national identity, 
and have trouble in accepting the pub-
lic manifestations of diversities, espe-
cially political rights of minority groups 
(national, ethnic, religious, sexual) and 
other differences that are inevitable in 
democratic societies. The youth show 
higher levels of social exclusives to re-
ligious and ethnic differences, especial-
ly to Serbian and Roma minority even 
in comparison to adults. The notion of 
what is politically correct has changed 
dramatically due to emergence, rela-
tivisation and, finally, acceptance of 
right-wing populism and extreme-con-
servative rhetoric that includes exclu-
sive and sometimes even hate speech. 
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Formal education system func-
tions undemocratically and does not 
teach students how to live every-day 
democracy, with only formal existence 
of the Students Councils, and with the 
lack of civic education that has not been 
introduced properly. Lack of the civic 
education that would be focused on 
development of civic and social com-
petences of students, social skills, dem-
ocratic values and knowledge about 
human rights, democracy, participation 
and sustainable development contrib-
utes to social exclusion and undemo-
cratic hate speech and behaviour. 
Civil society organizations for hu-
man rights are trying to turn those neg-
ative tendencies through advocacy, 
campaigns and non-formal education, 
but radical right movements that en-
courage ethnic and religious exclusive-
ness and fight against the rights of 
LGBTIQ people and reproductive rights 
of women are also very active through 
religious structures and the civil socie-
ty. Because of these, it is not even se-
cure that we will be able to protect the 
liberal democratic standards that we 
have today, and even further are chanc-
es for their development in future. The 
tendencies that the youth have more ex-
clusive and authoritarian attitudes raise 
the concern about the erosion of liber-
al democracy in Croatia. 
1. Researches that provide 
information about knowledge, 
values and attitudes of young 
people in Croatia as well as 
about their civic and political 
participation:  
– researches of the Institute 
for Social Research in Zagreb 
from 1986 and 1999 that 
included representative 
sample of Croatian youth,  
between 15 and 29 years 
(Radin, 1988; Radin, 2002); 
– research of the Institute 
for Social Research in Zagreb 
and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung 
in 2012 that included around 
1500 young people between 
14 and 27 years of age  (Ilišin, 
2013); 
– research that included 
around 2000 students (2012, 
The Institute for Social 
Research in Zagreb); 
– research of experimental 
implementation of the 
Curriculum for Civic 
Education (Spajić Vrkaš, 
2014); 
– research of the knowledge 
and attitudes about political 
and civic topics of high school 
graduates in school year 
2009/10 (GONG and Faculty of 
political sciences,  Bagić, 2011) 
and in school year 2014/15 
(GOOD Initiative with the 
Institute for Social Research 
in Zagreb and the experts 
from Zagreb University, 
Gvozdanović,  2015).






art to fight social exclusion 
and discrimination
Interview with Marta Meloni – ComicsForEquality
ECF: Can you briefly present the 
initiative?
MArTA MELonI: European societies have 
been increasingly changing under the 
influences of migration. The outstand-
ing quantity of interconnections among 
many cultures of the world requires 
new forms of intercultural communi-
cation and new forms of involvement 
among direct and indirect agents of this 
global movement. ComiX4= Comics 
for Equality has aimed to promote new 
forms of intercultural awareness, espe-
cially among youth, by primarily involv-
ing migrants and second generations in 
Europe in the artistic representation of 
their migration experiences.
The project produced the 
“1° European Award for the Best 
Unpublished Comics by Authors with 
Migrant Background”, which saw the 
participation of 41 comic artists with 
56 eligible comics from 21 different 
the author 
marta meloni. You 
surely noticed that this 
Activizenship’s issue 




been awarded the Media 
of the Year Award during 
the European Democratic 
Citizenship Award 
ceremony in Strasbourg. 
Marta Meloni is one 
of coordinators of the 
project. She tells us a bit 
more about it.
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European countries. The ComiX4= 
Award was the very first European 
Award on racism and intercultural is-
sues addressed only to comic artists 
with migrant backgrounds, who pre-
sented the multitude of ways in which 
migration can take shape and spoke 
about those aspects they or their par-
ents have lost, found or are in the pro-
cess of building. All the comics are 
available online in 9 different languag-
es on the website www.comix4equality.
eu and on our Facebook page. In 2 years 
time, hundreds of FB posts reached 
more than 370.000 people with more 
than 7.100 post likes and more than 
1.500 post shares. On the website it is 
also possible to download (in 9 differ-
ent languages) the ComiX4= catalogue 
(printed in 9000 copies) with a selec-
tion of the best comics of the Award, 
and the ComiX4= toolkit (printed in 
5000 copies) for media and intercul-
tural education with comics. ComiX4= 
went on tour with its exhibition in 10 
different EU countries (Italy, Bulgaria, 
Romania, Estonia, Latvia, Austria, 
Sweden, Belgium, Finland and Portugal) 
and implemented 15 intercultural com-
ics workshops in 5 EU countries (Italy, 
Bulgaria, Romania, Estonia and Latvia) 
with 200 young people, directed by 
some of the comic artists of the Award. 
The project ended with a final confer-
ence on new forms of communication 
for antiracism and migration with inter-
national speakers (Council of Europe, 
UNAR, Andalucia Acoge, Fabrica). 
The project showed its value 
throughout the years: ComiX4= Comics 
for Equality project was awarded with 
the Intercultural Innovation Award in 
2014, a partnership between United 
Nations Alliance of Civilisations and 
BMW Group and it was nominated 
Media Initiative of the Year in 2015 
within the European Democratic 
Citizenship Awards by the European 
Civic Forum. 
ComiX4= Comics for Equality was 
led by Africa e Mediterraneo (Italy), 
in partnership with NGO Mondo 
(Estonia), the Workshop for Civic 
Initiatives Foundation (Bulgaria), 
ARCA (Romania) and Grafiskie stas-
ti (Latvia) and the collaboration of the 
Associate partners Hamelin Association 
and MultiKulti Collective.
ECF: Can you tell us more about 
the people behind the project?
MArTA MELonI: The project was designed 
and coordinated by our young team at 
Africa e Mediterraneo (to know more: 
www.africaemediterraneo.it). We are all 
young motivated people with expertise 
in intercultural communication, media 
education and comics. We all love inno-
vative ways of communicate and inter-
act with young people on social issues, 
in particular on anti-racism, discrimi-
nation, stereotypes and migration. Also, 
this project wouldn’t have been possi-
ble without the outstanding profession-
al work of our partners and the energy 
of all young people who participated 
during all workshops, events and exhi-
bitions we carried out. 
ECF: Marta, why do you think the 
project is important?
MArTA MELonI: The project showed the 
necessity to give voice to the people 
who experienced some migration ex-
perience: their fears, their difficulties, 
their hopes and their ideas for the fu-
ture were at the centre of this project 
and, at the same time, were the main el-
ements of the communication and edu-
cational campaign of the entire project. 
The project was made for them and was 
possible thanks to their creativity and 
their great spirit of collaboration and 
sharing.   
As our project clearly showed, a 
correct and viral communication on 
these topics is crucial and fundamental 
for a promotion of a positive narrative 
on migration. In fact, fair, true and bi-
as-free communication should be one 
of the main pillar of the effective man-
agement of the so called “refugee cri-
sis”. We cannot expect to successfully 
create welcoming European communi-
ties if media often describe refugees and 
migration as a “problem”, as a “crisis” 
and as a “threat”. We should all – and 
“we” stands for the civil society, public 
authorities and communication agen-
cies – act for a positive language and 
narrative, aimed to describe and tackle 
the migration issue as a resource, an op-
portunity, giving space to best practic-
es, positive experiences in the local 




reviving youth engagement in greece 
By Dimitris Makrystathis
cRisis and youth
Nowadays Greece is facing a financial 
crisis that has multiple effects on so-
ciety, while Europe in general tries to 
identify or reconsider its position on 
the world. Many support that there is 
lack of core values in Europe, such as 
solidarity and respect between nations 
and states. Young activists try to prove 
them wrong! They organize themselves, 
cooperate smoothly, promote youth 
mobility and take various solidarity in-
itiatives. They fight against populism 
and extremism by all means; they build 
tomorrow’s Europe by acting immedi-
ately today when and where needed.
VolunteeRing Rise 
in gReece
Youth is one the most affected groups 
by the crisis in Greece. Youth unem-
ployment rate stands at about 60% and 
young people’s future perspectives are 
the author 
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grim, at best. Thousands of young peo-
ple emigrated searching for better job 
opportunities and living conditions; the 
risk of a brain drain is clearly visible in 
the near future.
On the other side, the crisis led to a 
flowering of civil society and volunteer-
ing-based initiatives. New initiatives 
came out and many innovative youth-
led projects implemented. Young peo-
ple have to be nowadays adaptable in 
order to overcome the challenges and 
barriers they face. One of this success-
ful youth initiatives will be presented in 
this article: Youthnet Hellas.
youthnet hellas:  
how it all staRted
In 2009 a handful of motivated young 
people from all over Greece decided 
to channel their vitality and energy in 
a new youth-led NGO, while making 
use of their rich experiences and useful 
knowledge on Youth Policies, European 
Mobility Programmes and Volunteering. 
They established “Youthnet Hellas”, a 
non-governmental organisation that 
aims to engage young people at differ-
ent levels through innovative activities, 
and to promote young people’s active 
participation, information, social in-
clusion and active citizenship in com-
munity life. It soon became one of the 
most active and popular youth NGOs 
in Greece!
Youthnet Hellas’ specific goals 
include:
 ɖ enhancing the role of young people 
in decision-making processes;
 ɖ endorsing the development and 
implementation of policies supporting 
children’s and young people’s rights;
 ɖ encouraging environment-friendly 
activities;
 ɖ advocating for the respect and 
advancement of democracy, peace, 
diversity and human rights;
 ɖ strengthening of democratic values 
and human rights;
 ɖ encouraging exchange mobility and 
multicultural dialogue among young 
people regardless of their nationality.
innoVation in pRactice
Youthnet Hellas was innovative since 
its very first moments. It operates as 
an online organisation and thus an en-
vironment-friendly NGO. It doesn’t use 
offices, it consists only of volunteers 
and has never received any state fund-
ing. Its members and volunteers live in 
almost every city of Greece, from lit-
tle islands and border villages to towns 
and big cities. Youthnet Hellas already 
counts more than 350 members and 
hundreds of active volunteers!
The flexible online way of operat-
ing gives the advantage to work with 
young people from villages and remote 
areas that don’t have access to any other 
organisations, projects, initiatives or ac-
tivities. It gives them the chance to stay 
informed about youth policies, be more 
active in their community and take lo-
cal initiatives.
The organisation’s website 
and social media pages are used as 
platforms to inform young people for 
all the formal and non-formal education 
opportunities available in Greece and 
Europe, as well internships and work 
opportunities. So far, more than 9000 
young Greeks follow the news on social 
media and more than 15000 visit the 
website daily. The last years, more 
than 600 young people participated in 
more than 180 EU funded programmes. 
In 2014 only, 121 young people (in 35 
projects) benefited from these funds!
Recognition  
at euRopean leVel
Although working on a voluntary ba-
sis, Youthnet Hellas has an important 
presence, as well as distinctions in 
European level. Its actions are well rec-
ognised abroad in various ways.
In 2013 Youthnet Hellas was 
awarded the European Citizen’s Prize 
by the European Parliament and the 
UNESCO label at UNESCO’s 8th Youth 
Forum in 2013 for the project “Training 
for Developing Youth Reporting 
Capacities”. The continuous efforts of 
its members and volunteers, and the 
implementation of innovative activi-
ties led to another prize in 2015, name-
ly the “NGO of the Year” laureate at 
the European Democratic Citizenship 
Awards organised by European Civic 
Forum. In addition, Youthnet Hellas 
is the only Greek NGO member of 
the Advisory Council on Youth of the 
Council of Europe for the 2014-2015 
mandate.
All these awards recognized mainly 
the innovative work that has been done 
during the writing of the “Greek Youth 
Policy Report” over the last four years, 
and the significant efforts to promote 
the educational mobility of young peo-
ple in Europe.
gReek youth policy 
RepoRting
The absence of national initiatives and 
campaigns for young people is visible in 
Greece, so the youth-led organisation, 
need to step in and provide even more 
support to young people. During the 
last years Youthnet Hellas works hard 
on it and has already influenced the na-
tional youth policies by publishing the 
“Greek Youth Policy Report” annually 
since 2010.
In this report’s pages, the situation 
in the youth field in Greece is reflect-
ed every year. It highlights the well-or-
ganised work done in the youth field, 
and promotes the main actions and ac-
tivities implemented by Greek NGOs 
and youth institutions. Thus, these or-
ganisations can see their work and ef-
forts recognized. The report is not only 
published online, but is also available in 
printed version in public and universi-
ty libraries across the country, giving it 















youth policy RepoRting 
know-how tRansfeR
Youthnet Hellas strongly believes and 
works towards a closer cooperation be-
tween stakeholders, actors and organ-
izations in the youth field. Developing 
sustainable synergies among youth-led 
NGOs would empower more young 
people globally in a long-term peri-
od. Thus, know-how transfer between 
youth organizations and other relevant 
institutions is valuable to achieve this 
goal.
For this reason, the project 
“Training for Developing Youth 
Reporting Capacities (You.Re.Ca.)” was 
implemented on July 2015. 50 young 
people from 41 countries were given 
a trained in order to develop capaci-
ties so that they are able to create their 
own countries’ Youth Policy Reports. 
Experienced trainers transferred this 
valuable know-how to young people 
with the aim to develop similar initia-
tives in their countries.
The You.Re.Ca. project was 
sponsored by UNESCO and the 
State of Kuwait and was one of the 15 
projects awarded the UNESCO label at 
UNESCO’s 8th Youth Forum in 2013 out 
of the 1532 totally submitted projects 
from around the world. Following its 
great success, the You.Re.Ca. project 
was presented during the 9th UNESCO 
Youth Forum in Paris and the Social 
Innovation and Global Ethics Forum 
2015 in Geneva!
defending human Rights 
and combating hate 
speech
Youthnet Hellas is a European-oriented 
organisation that represents most of the 
core European values in Greece. Active 
youth participation is its most impor-
tant sector, while it is active also to val-
ues such as respect of human rights, 
freedom of speech and democratic dia-
logue. In the past, Youthnet Hellas has 
contributed a lot with its projects and 
initiatives in other values such as toler-
ance and non-discrimination, minority 
rights and gender equality.
The absence of a National 
Campaign Committee, led Youthnet 
Hellas to become a partner of the 
Council of Europe’s “No Hate Speech 
Movement” campaign and run it in 
Greece, by creating a Facebook page 
and promoting the campaign online 
in Greek language. Already more than 
2,000 people have been informed about 
this important campaign and many 
awareness raising activities are planned 
for the next months throughout Greece.
looking towaRds the 
futuRe
As the 2015 reaches to the end, Youthnet 
Hellas plans its future activities having 
in mind young people’s needs and ex-
pectations in Greece. It is of high im-
portance to defend human rights and 
democracy in the times of crisis and 
Youthnet Hellas will have a leading role 
in it. Many projects are planned and will 
be implemented soon, including 
support mechanisms for young refu-
gees, anti-bullying campaigns and many 
more. We all strive towards a better and 
fairer future for Europe’s young gener-
ations! 
Youthnet Hellas has been 
awarded NGO of the year within 
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